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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Executive Summary 
Eighteen years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States continues to grapple with how to 
defeat the terrorist threat.  Though U.S. counterterrorism strategy has prevented another large-
scale, foreign-born terrorist attack on U.S. soil, it has not succeeded in defeating terrorist groups 
themselves.  By tracing global terrorist activity, several distinct trendlines appear, revealing that 
today’s terrorist groups are more dangerous, dynamic, and difficult to defeat than ever before.  
Yet, in the next decade, counterterrorism officials will face emerging strategic challenges that are 
even more complex.  Terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are building 
international networks of allied terrorist groups, thousands of foreign fighters who traveled to 
Iraq and Syria to fight for ISIS are dispersing around the world, and terrorists are arming 
themselves with the technical tools and expertise they need to conduct crippling cyberattacks.  
To undermine the groups that perpetuate these threats, the U.S. must layer sensible strategies that 
suffocate terrorist groups’ ability to survive.  Two decades of evidence suggests that capturing or 
killing every terrorist in the greater Middle East is not a realistic outcome.  Instead, the U.S. 
should refine the role of law enforcement to combat terrorist finance, place a greater focus on 
undermining the ideology that allows terrorist groups to regenerate their recruits, and begin to 
marginalize terrorist activity online, effectively eroding terrorist groups’ preferred 
communication channel and recruitment pipeline.  Only by severing the support structures that 
maintain terrorist groups will the U.S. be better positioned to combat terrorism in the 2020s.  
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Project Overview 
Why This Research Is Important.  The Global War on Terror will soon enter its third 
decade and, despite tremendous financial and human resources, the international community is 
no closer to defeating twenty-first-century terrorist organizations.  One theory to explain this is 
that policymakers have focused primarily on preventing today’s attacks, rather than tomorrow’s 
challenges, resulting in a game of cat-and-mouse led by asymmetric warfare.  In order to prevent 
terrorist successes, rather than react to them, counterterrorism officials must recognize and 
respond to the future of terrorism.  Thus, a strategic forecast such as this will provide officials 
with opportunities to become better prepared to combat terrorism in the 2020s. 
According to counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, all terrorists share one common 
denominator: they “live” in the future, continuously planning and preparing, convinced they will 
defeat their enemies and achieve their political goals.1  In response, the counterterrorism 
community must devote equal or greater attention to the future, keeping in mind that their 
decisions today will have lasting effects in the decades to come.  Long-term thinking is critical to 
framing a successful strategy and should be at the forefront of counterterrorism.  It pushes 
policymakers and practitioners to reexamine expectations, assumptions, and ambiguities.2  It also 
invites discussion and debate, creating opportunities to generate greater insights for assessing 
strategic risks.3  Forecasting the future is an undoubtedly difficult but worthy endeavor; one that 
does not pretend to provide definitive answers but rather an insightful outlook of emerging 
phenomena.  
                                                      
1 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 169; Boaz Ganor, “Terrorism in 
the Twenty-First Century,” in Essentials of Terror Medicine, ed. Shmuel C. Shapira, Jeffrey S. Hammond, and 
Leonard A. Cole (New York, NY: Springer, 2009), 13, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-48479-
6_8. 
2 “Trends Transforming the Global Landscape,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 9, 2017, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-trends/trends-transforming-the-global-landscape. 
3 Ibid. 
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Chapter Overview.  This thesis encompasses in-depth research and analysis on a variety 
of terrorism and counterterrorism-related topics.  It is divided into three chapters, which are 
designed to serve as building blocks for strategic thinking.  Data and information represented in 
this paper have been gathered from a variety of academic sources, including open-source 
databases, government publications, critically-acclaimed books, accredited news reports, and 
scholarly articles, which have been synthesized to provide a comprehensive, strategic forecast of 
terrorism in the 2020s. 
Global Trends and Trajectories of Terrorism.  The first chapter begins by exploring the 
history, status, and future of global terrorism.  It explains that modern terrorist activity has 
occurred in distinct ideological waves and introduces the reader to the present wave of 
religiously motivated terrorism.  It then presents a statistical analysis of global terrorist activity 
from 1970-2017 using data from the Global Terrorism Database, the most comprehensive open-
source database of terrorist activity in the world.  In this chapter, data is used to demonstrate that 
terrorist activity fluctuates, terrorist activity is generally concentrated among hotspots, those 
hotspots move over time, and terrorism is a growing and global problem.  Collectively, these 
insights provide a foundation for examining the global threat landscape. 
Emerging Strategic Challenges.  The second chapter identifies three emerging strategic 
challenges that counterterrorism officials will face in the 2020s.  First, it highlights the formation 
and growth of international terrorist networks and discusses how they will challenge 
policymakers in the next decade.  Next, it discusses the impending challenge presented by 
thousands of ISIS foreign fighters who have left Iraq and Syria to either return to their native 
countries or relocate elsewhere.  Then, it identifies the looming prospect of cyberterrorism, 
highlighting terrorist organizations’ recent development of technical tools and proficiencies. 
 4 
Opportunity Analysis for U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy.  The third chapter highlights 
opportunities for improvement in U.S. counterterrorism.  First, it examines how terrorist groups 
have been defeated in the past, investigates the nexus between crime and terror, and evaluates the 
role of law enforcement in combating terrorism.  Next, it explains how policymakers can chart a 
path toward delegitimizing the ideology that fuels twenty-first-century terrorism by constructing 
and communicating effective counter-narratives.  Finally, it discusses tactics for marginalizing 
terrorist activity online, thereby reducing terrorist recruitment and radicalization.  Combined, 
these proposals provide sensible supplements to a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. 
Conclusion.  Overall, this project provides a timely, strategic forecast of terrorism in the 
2020s.  It illustrates the global trends and trajectories of terrorism, identifies emerging strategic 
challenges, and outlines practical policy recommendations for U.S. counterterrorism strategy.   
Findings are rooted in data-driven research and analysis and will serve as useful tools for others 
who are seeking to understand the evolution and trajectory of the global threat landscape.  Most 
importantly, however, is that throughout this project, opportunities are identified to help shape 
the future, rather than simply respond to it.  After all, we cannot reasonably expect the Global 
War on Terror to reach a favorable outcome if the opposition continues to chart its course. 
 
Definitions and Terminology 
There is no universally accepted definition of “terrorism,” making it difficult to 
characterize and quantify.  So, when conducting terrorism research, it is imperative to use a clear 
and consistent definition; otherwise, research findings may become complicated or confused.  
This project uses the definition and terminology outlined by the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  
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The GTD defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence 
by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation.”4  This definition is critically important to the development of the 
GTD—and this project—because it determines what data is collected and analyzed.  In order to 
be included as an incident in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present: 
 
1. The incident must be intentional—the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a 
perpetrator. 
 
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence, including 
property violence, as well as violence against people. 
 
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.  The database purposefully 
does not include acts of state terrorism.5 
 
 
In addition to this baseline definition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present 
for an incident to be included in the GTD: 
 
• The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.  In terms of 
economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion.  It must involve 
the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change. 
 
• There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message 
to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.  It is the action taken as a 
totality that is considered, irrespective of whether every individual involved in carrying out 
the act was aware of this intention.  As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind 
the attack intended to coerce, intimidate, or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met. 
 
• The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.  That is, the act must 
be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the 
prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).6 
 
                                                      
4 “Global Terrorism Database: Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” The National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), July 2018, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
 6 
This comprehensive definition is inclusive, yet specific, providing a proper framework for 
classifying what constitutes terrorism, terrorist activity, and terrorist attacks.  This definition 
applies throughout this project, ensuring that its references to terrorism are both clear and 
consistent.  Its thoroughness and attention to detail also serve to demonstrate the importance of 
precisely identifying the threat we face. 
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GLOBAL TRENDS AND TRAJECTORIES OF TERRORISM 
 
Introduction 
One of the most difficult challenges for counterterrorism officials is identifying the next 
conflict or cultural catalyst that will energize or transform global terrorist activity.7  It is for this 
reason why forecasting the future of terrorism can be incredibly difficult.  On a macro level, 
however, one of the best predictors of future behavior is past performance.  Through the careful 
collection and analysis of terrorism data, researchers can trace the global trends and trajectories 
of terrorism to illustrate the global threat landscape.  When combined with a contextual 
understanding of world events, a statistical analysis can be used to provide key insights regarding 
the history, status, and future of global terrorism. 
 
The History of Terrorism 
Origins.  Organized terrorism can be traced back to the first century when a splinter 
group of the Jewish Zealots called the Sicarii formed to overthrow their Roman oppressors.  At 
the time, the Romans had captured the city of Jerusalem and were occupying Judea, and the 
Sicarii sought to gain independence and install their own system of religious-based governance.  
In order to influence their peers, the Sicarii engaged in guerilla warfare against not only the 
Romans but also complicit Jewish leaders whom they considered to be traitors to their cause.  
Tactically, the Sicarii would hide within crowds, wait for their enemies to come near, and stab 
them with daggers before retreating and blending in with the masses.8 
                                                      
7 Daniel Byman, “Was Syria Different? Anticipating the Next Islamic State,” Lawfare, November 20, 2018, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/was-syria-different-anticipating-next-islamic-state. 
8 “What Is Terrorism?” Operation250 Inc., accessed on February 15, 2019, https://www.operation250.org/what-is-
terrorism-1/. 
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Another early terrorist group is known as the Assassins, a sect of Islamic extremists that 
operated during the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.  Established with the aim of 
overthrowing the existing order in Islam, the Assassins believed that Islamic leaders had strayed 
away from the religion’s fundamental principles.  Seeking to restore what they believed was the 
correct interpretation of religious rule, the group began to assassinate prominent Islamic leaders.  
Targeting both its political and religious enemies, the Assassins became the first group to make 
systematic use of murder as a political weapon.9 
Though examples of organizations using violence to achieve political objectives can be 
found throughout history, the term “terrorism” was not coined until the end of the eighteenth 
century.  Interestingly, the term was not created to describe the intentions or tactics of a non-state 
actor.  Rather, it became the popular term to categorize the actions of a government.  After the 
French Revolution overthrew the monarchy, the newfound government sought to purge their 
country of those they deemed a threat.  The Reign of Terror, as it would become known, was a 
period in which the ruling political party, known as the Jacobins, executed tens of thousands of 
French citizens who opposed the revolution and refused to recognize its legitimacy.10 
The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism.  Though the abundant use of terrorism would 
eventually lead to each of these groups’ demise, the tactic itself has proven to live on.  In the past 
140 years, terrorism has evolved and spread across the globe in a pattern-like fashion.  To 
describe this phenomenon, Dr. David Rapoport penned “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 
which has become one of the most influential theories in the field of terrorism studies.11  
                                                      
9 Bernard Lewis, The Assassins (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 129. 
10 “Terrorism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed on February 15, 2019, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism. 
11 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 (2002), 
http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror/. 
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Following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Dr. Rapoport established a 
theoretical framework for modern terrorism by grouping previously indistinguishable patterns of 
political violence into four distinct waves.12  In his work, Dr. Rapoport identified that since the 
late 1800s, each wave has been inspired by prevailing socio-political motivations and each has 
lasted a generation.  Chronologically, these include the Anarchist, Anti-Colonial, New Left, and 
Religious Waves—the last of which persists today.  It is important to note that more than one 
type of terrorism occurred throughout the world during these given time frames.  However, the 
waves are named after the most dominant form of terrorism during that period of time, which 
made up the overwhelming majority of terrorist activity.13 
The Anarchist Wave.  The first wave of modern terrorism began in 1880.  Until then, 
most revolutionary groups had relied on peaceful strategies such as distributing pamphlets and 
holding demonstrations to voice their grievances.  However, when these strategies became 
ineffective to influencing their peers or achieving their goals, terrorism emerged as a way to re-
engage the general public in a panic-inducing and time-sensitive way.  As a result, assassination 
became a common tactic for anarchist groups.  In fact, the 1890s are sometimes referred to as the 
“Golden Age of Assassination,” as the leaders of Russia (Tsar Alexander I), France (President 
Marie François Sadi Carnot), and the United States (President William McKinley), were all shot 
and killed within the decade.14  Although at times anarchists proved to be tactically effective, 
overall, they were unable to achieve any lasting political change. 
                                                      
12 Erin Walls, “Waves of Modern Terrorism: Examining the Past and Predicting the Future,” Georgetown 
University, April 5, 2017, 1, 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1043900/Walls_georgetown_0076M_13610.pdf?s
equence=1. 
13 “What is Terrorism?” 
14 Ibid. 
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 The Anti-Colonial Wave.  The second wave began in the 1920s, soon after the end of 
World War I.  After the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was 
divided into independent nations, each of which was overseen by a colonial power.  In response, 
natives of these lands organized to bring attention to their collective grievances, undermine the 
authority of their perceived occupiers, and convince them to cede control.  Examples of such 
groups include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which fought the British government to unite 
Northern Ireland, and the Irgun, which attacked the British in Palestine in an effort to create a 
separate Jewish nation.  Unlike the first wave, anti-colonial groups preferred attacking police and 
military targets.  In addition, some of these groups received funding from foreign governments 
and diasporas, individuals who had moved away from their ancestral homelands but were 
sympathetic to the cause.  Terrorist groups in this wave were more successful than those in the 
first.  In fact, some were able to achieve part or the majority of their political goals.15 
The New Left Wave.  The third wave began during the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s.  
This wave of terrorism was characterized by the idea that Western powers had committed 
atrocities against third world countries.  As a result, terrorist groups arose around the world to 
raise awareness, denounce the West, and promote their own political ideologies.  Students and 
well-educated members of society were the driving force behind many of the groups created 
during this wave.  Additionally, many groups around the world received support from the Soviet 
Union, which viewed such sponsorship as a supplement to its formal diplomacy.  At this time, 
kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings were frequently used tactics, targeted at government 
assets.  However, by the 1980s these groups had been largely defeated all over the world.16 
                                                      
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
 11 
The Religious Wave.  The fourth and present wave began in 1979, a revolutionary year in 
Islamic culture following the Camp David Accords, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.  It is important to note that all religions have had terrorist groups arise 
at some point in history.  Whether it be the Christian extremists such as the Ku Klux Klan or 
Islamic extremists such as al-Qaeda, these groups believe that their members are superior to non-
members and have found justifications for violence in perverse interpretations of their respective 
religions.17  Though organizations from varying religions have fueled the present wave of 
modern terrorism, jihadist terrorism has comprised much of its activity, becoming both the most 
well-known and the most deadly.  Furthermore, suicide attacks have become a highly lethal and 
popular tactic among modern, religious terrorist groups. 
In his 2001 publication, Dr. Rapoport predicted that if the generational life cycle remains 
constant, the Religious Wave, which has given birth to organizations such as al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State, should dissipate in the 2020s and be ultimately replaced by a new ideological 
wave.18  However, what differentiates this wave from the former three are direct military 
engagements in countries that foster the ideological movement.  In addition to extended military 
campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, authoritative governments, prolonged civil wars, and 
humanitarian crises have fueled religious extremism throughout the greater Middle East.  As a 
result, this wave has yielded the greatest number of terrorist organizations, terrorist attacks, and 
terrorism-related deaths in history.19  Moreover, as jihadist terrorist organizations continue to 
recruit and operate, and youth age in incubators for extremism, the Religious Wave will likely 
prevail past the 2020s, becoming the longest-lasting modern wave of terrorism, as well.  
                                                      
17 Ibid. 
18 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror.” 
19 Max Roser, Mohamed Nagdy, and Hannah Ritchie, “Terrorism,” Our World in Data, January 2018, 
https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism. 
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The State of Terrorism Research 
Overview.  Shortly after September 11, 2001, Dr. Andrew Silke, a distinguished 
academic and leading expert on terrorism, made a poignant comment about the state of research 
in the field of study.20  Describing it as fundamentally malnourished, Dr. Silke wrote that 
terrorism research “existed on a diet of fast food”; studies that were “quick, cheap, ready-to-
hand, and nutritionally dubious.”21  Dr. Silke made this critical valuation based on several key 
contentions.  First, policymakers, academics, and experts had not reached a consensus on the 
definition of terrorism—a complication that continues to confuse terrorism research today.  In 
fact, more than 100 definitions of terrorism have appeared in professional literature and, without 
a clear, common definition, it is difficult to conduct consistent research and develop a 
meaningful knowledge base.22  Second, Dr. Silke points out that most of the existing terrorism 
research was not based on quantitative analysis.  Publications rarely featured statistical 
examination, and the data that had been collected was mostly descriptive, rather than inferential.  
Third, research was neither adaptive nor predictive, and therefore largely inapplicable and 
uninformative to the policymaking process.  In his 2001 publication, Dr. Silke wrote, “Research 
is ultimately aimed at arriving at a level of knowledge and understanding where one can explain 
why certain events have happened and be able to accurately predict the emergence and outcome 
of similar events in the future.  Terrorism research, however, has failed to arrive at that level of 
knowledge.”23  As a result, when the War on Terror was catalyzed, policymakers did not have 
the tools or information they needed to responsibly inform an effective counterterrorism strategy. 
                                                      
20 Brent Turvey, Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis. San Diego: Academic Press, 
2012, 574. 
21 Andrew Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 12. 
22 Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004), 65; Turvey, Criminal 
Profiling, 574. 
23 Silke, “The Devil You Know,” 1. 
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About the Global Terrorism Database.  Shortly after Dr. Silke’s publication, 
researchers at the University of Maryland began to curate the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
an open-source database of information on terrorist attacks around the world.  Today, the GTD 
contains data from 1970-2017, with annual updates planned for the future.  For each GTD event, 
information is available on the date and location, weapons used, type of target, number of 
casualties, and, when identifiable, the group or individual responsible for the attack.24  Statistical 
information contained in the GTD is based on reports from a variety of open media sources but is 
not included unless and until a trained team of researchers has determined the sources are 
credible.  In fact, more than 4,000,000 news articles from over 25,000 news sources were 
reviewed to collect incident data from 1998-2017 alone.25  Furthermore, with data collected on 
more than 180,000 cases of attempted or successful terrorist attacks, the GTD is currently the 
most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist attacks in the world.26 
The GTD is a product of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), a counterterrorism research and education center housed at 
the University of Maryland.  Dependent on critically important grants and funding, START 
makes the GTD available online to the public for free to increase the scientific understanding of 
the causes and consequences of terrorism so that it can be more readily studied and defeated.  
Leading news organizations around the world frequently cite the GTD, and it serves as a 
principal resource for policymakers and practitioners.  Using GTD data, researchers are also able 
to trace the empirical trends and trajectories of terrorism and offer a glimpse of what 
developments are likely to follow.  
                                                      
24 “Overview of the GTD,” The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START), accessed on February 26, 2019, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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Statistical Analysis 
Terrorism Ebbs and Flows.  Much like the stock market, global terrorism is influenced 
by international political climates, impactful government policies, and significant world events.  
Comparatively, both are complex, interrelated systems made up of a multitude of international 
bodies that primarily make uncoordinated decisions.  Like stocks, terrorism ebbs and flows, can 
be seemingly unexplainable, and is undoubtedly difficult to predict.  As any good investor 
knows, the production of a single day, week, or even month may not reflect the overall trajectory 
of a stock’s annual output.  However, when earnings are tracked over time, they reveal trends 
that can help to produce a useful forecast.  Similarly, by tracking terrorism, policymakers and 
practitioners can be better equipped to forecast future threats (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Terrorist Attacks by Year (1970-2016) 
 
Note: Number of total attacks, fatal attacks, and attacks that produced more than 10 fatalities 
from 1970-2016.  Data are shown by year.  Source: Global Terrorism Database.27  
                                                      
27 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global Terrorism 
Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; Gary LaFree, “The Future of Terrorism” 
[PowerPoint], The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Presented 
on June 18, 2018. 
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Since 1970, global terrorism has experienced periods of both growth and decline.  After 
slight increases from 1970-1978, the number of total attacks and fatal attacks experienced a 
period of steady growth until 1992.  Corresponding with world events, this growth was likely 
catalyzed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the onset of the Religious Wave of 
terrorism.  Moreover, the number of attacks that produced more than 10 fatalities grew rapidly 
from 1978-1983, before returning to levels that were more historically constant.28 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, global terrorism declined almost every year from 1992-
1998.  After reaching a 23-year-low in 1998, the number of total attacks around the globe 
remained relatively low until 2004.  However, 2004 marked a trend change.  Likely fueled by the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, the number of total attacks, fatal attacks, and attacks that produced more 
than 10 fatalities grew almost every year from 2004-2011. 
Then, from 2011-2014, each category experienced an unprecedented and exponential 
surge.  Over this three-year period, the number of total attacks grew 232%, only to be slightly 
outperformed by the rise of fatal attacks, which grew 260%.  Largely driven by the rise of ISIS 
and the widespread political unrest that swept across the Middle East and North Africa during 
the Arab Spring, the number of terrorist attacks reached historical highs.  At its peak in 2014, 
there were nearly 17,000 terrorist attacks around the world, compared to only 756 a decade 
before.  Since 2014, the numbers of total attacks, fatal attacks, and attacks that produced more 
than 10 fatalities have subsided.  2017 marks the third consecutive year of declining numbers of 
attacks worldwide.  However, with 10,900 terrorist attacks killing more than 26,400 individuals 
in 2017 alone, terrorist violence remains extraordinarily high compared to historical norms.29  
                                                      
28 “Global Terrorism in 2017,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START), August 2018, 1, https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_Overview2017_July2018.pdf. 
29 Ibid. 
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Consistent with the growth and decline of terrorist attacks worldwide, the number of 
fatalities that resulted from attacks experienced an exponential surge from 2011-2014 at a 
combined growth rate of 440% (see Figure 2).  At its peak, global terrorist attacks produced 
44,490 deaths in 2014 alone—more than thirteen times higher than the number of terrorism-
related fatalities in 2003.  Though the number of fatalities has decreased each year since, the 
figure remains historically high.  In 2017, global terrorism produced 26,445 fatalities, a figure 
which would have been unprecedented only four years prior.  Moreover, terrorist attacks 
produced nearly as many fatalities in the last six years (182,429) as they had in the 25 years prior 
(183,960).30  Though terrorist activity experienced a significant influx around the globe during 
this time, the majority of attacks and fatalities took place in only a few highly concentrated areas. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Number of Fatalities from Terrorist Attacks (1970-2017) 
 
Note: Data are shown by year.  Source: Global Terrorism Database.31 
                                                      
30 Ibid. 
31 “Global Terrorism Database.” 
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Terrorism Occurs in Hotspots.  In 2016, START published “45 Years of Terrorism,” a 
special edition of its annual GTD World Map, which displays the concentration and intensity of 
terrorist attacks that occurred throughout the world from 1970-2015 (see Figure 3).  Using 
advanced geographic information system (GIS) data, START researchers plotted over 350,000 
terrorist attacks, assigning value to both fatalities and injuries.  As a result, START researchers 
identified that over the past 45 years, the majority of terrorist activity has been primarily 
concentrated in relatively small pockets of the world. 
 
 
Figure 3.  45 Years of Terrorism (1970-2015) 
 
Note: Geographic information system (GIS) data used to demonstrate concentration.  Intensity 
value is a combination of incident fatalities and injuries.  Source: The National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).32 
 
                                                      
32 William Kammerer, “45 Years of Terrorism: Terrorist Attacks 1970-2015, Concentration and Intensity,” The 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/images/START_GTD_Heat_Map_2017.jpg. 
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Though the identified hotspots are spread across several continents, each is generally 
contained within regional swaths.  Moving from west to east, the first hotspot was once located 
along the northeast coast of South America, with activity spilling into parts of Central America.  
Next, concentrations of terrorist activity are spread throughout the Sahel, a belt of mostly 
ungoverned territory that stretches horizontally across the African continent, while pockets also 
appear in North and East Africa.  Moreover, an Eastern Mediterranean region known as the 
Levant has sustained unprecedented intensities of terrorist violence.  Comprised of countries 
such as Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Levant experienced the highest concentration of terrorism 
during the 45-year data sample.  While smaller hotspots appear along the southern tip of the 
Arabian Peninsula and the islands of Southeast Asia, the largest hotspot in terms of geographic 
size stretches across South Asia.  From the northern intersection of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
India, to the borderlands dividing India and Bangladesh, South Asia has been plagued by terrorist 
activity for decades, making it the longest-lasting terrorism hotspot in modern history.33 
Today, terrorism remains heavily concentrated in several hotspots and often coincides 
with other types of political violence.  In 2016, more than 75% of terrorist attacks took place in 
just 10 countries.34  Similarly, in 2017, more than half of all attacks took place in four countries: 
Iraq (23%), Afghanistan (13%), India (9%), and Pakistan (7%)—and more than half of all deaths 
took place in three countries: Iraq (24%), Afghanistan (23%), and Syria (8%).35  Though 
terrorism in the twenty-first century has become primarily associated with countries in and 
around the Middle East, the region has not always been a hub for terrorism.  In fact, for decades, 
terrorist activity was far more common in Western nations.  
                                                      
33 Ibid. 
34 Sophie Chou, “More Than 75 Percent of Terrorist Attacks in 2016 Took Place in Just 10 Countries,” PRI, July 14, 
2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-07-14/more-75-percent-terrorist-attacks-2016-took-place-just-10-countries. 
35 “Global Terrorism in 2017.” 
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Terrorism Moves Geographically.  While terrorism has historically been confined and 
concentrated, terrorism hotspots have moved geographically over time (see Table 1).  Largely 
influenced by the dominant ideological wave, terrorism has affected different parts of the world 
at different times in history.  In the 1970s, four of the five countries that experienced the most 
terrorist attacks were Western nations.  During this time, Northern Ireland experienced the 
highest number of attacks, primarily due to the tactics of the IRA, but was closely followed by 
the United States, which experienced the highest number of domestic terrorist attacks in its 
history during the New Left Wave.36 
 
Table 1.  Countries with the Most Terrorist Attacks by Decade (1970-2009) 
 
Note: Data are shown by decade.  Source: Global Terrorism Database.37 
 
  
1970s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
#1   Northern Ireland 1,483 ⚫  Peru 4,222   Colombia 2,835 ⚫  Iraq 5,189 
#2   United States 1,384 ⚫  El Salvador 4,123 ⚫  India 1,791 =  India 2,570 
#3   Italy 1,022 ⚫  Colombia 2,951   Peru 1,781   Pakistan 1,980 
#4   Spain 901 ⚫  Chile 1,744 ⚫  Turkey 1,666 ⚫  Afghanistan 1,949 
#5   Turkey 484 ⚫  Guatemala 1,483 ⚫  Pakistan 1,601 ⚫  Thailand 1,228 
 
⚫   Not in the top five countries the previous decade    =   Same ranking as the previous decade 
 
   Increased ranking from the previous decade       Decreased ranking from the previous decade 
 
 
 
                                                      
36 “Global Terrorism Database.” 
37 “Ibid.”; LaFree, “The Future of Terrorism.” 
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By the 1980s, global terrorist activity had shifted primarily to Central and South 
America, which was home to all five of the countries with the most terrorist attacks during the 
decade.  The five most affected countries from the decade before had been entirely replaced, 
demonstrating the mobility of terrorist hotspots.  Furthermore, due to the high volume of terrorist 
attacks in the 1980s, the country with the fifth most terrorist attacks experienced the same 
number as the country with the most attacks a decade before it.38 
Although global terrorism subsided in the 1990s, hotspots remained.  While the number 
of terrorist attacks in Colombia decreased from the decade prior, it actually moved up the 
leaderboard to become the country with the most terrorist attacks, largely due to a surge in narco-
terrorism and a lack of global competition.  During the 1990s, hotspots began to appear more 
frequently in South Asia, plaguing countries such as India and Pakistan.  Turkey returned to the 
top five countries with the most terrorist attacks in the 1990s, after having last appeared during 
the 1970s. 39 
Shortly after the new century began, so did a new era in global terrorism.  Featuring 
prolonged military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2000s cemented the shift of 
terrorist activity to the Middle East and South Asia.  Iraq, which made its first appearance on the 
list, led the world with 5,189 terrorist attacks.  India experienced a 44% increase in the number 
of terrorist attacks from the decade prior, while Pakistan experienced a 24% growth.  
Afghanistan, which placed fourth in its first appearance on the list, experienced 1,949 terrorist 
attacks in the 2000s.  Meanwhile, Thailand also experienced a surplus of terrorist activity, 
becoming the first country from Southeast Asia to qualify in the 40-year data sample.40 
                                                      
38 “Global Terrorism Database.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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Although only eight years of data are available, reasonable conclusions can be made 
about terrorism in the 2010s (see Table 2).  During the second decade of the Global War on 
Terror, terrorist activity erupted in the greater Middle East.  Iraq, which leads the world in the 
number of terrorist attacks for the second decade in a row, has already experienced 19,286 
terrorist attacks in the past eight years and is on pace to experience a 365% increase in terrorist 
attacks from the decade prior.  To put the dramatic surge into perspective, in the 2010s, Iraq is on 
pace to experience nearly double the number of attacks experienced by the five most affected 
countries during the 2000s combined.  Similarly, if trends continue, terrorist activity is set to rise 
584% in Afghanistan, 567% in Pakistan, and 209% in India.  This data demonstrates that global 
terrorist activity has not only reached unprecedented levels, but its regional concentrations are 
also being actively cultivated across the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia.41 
 
Table 2.  Countries with the Most Terrorist Attacks (2010-2017) 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database.42 
 
#1   Iraq 19,286 
 
#6   Nigeria 
 
3,569 
#2   Afghanistan 10,658 
 
#7   Somalia 
 
3,488 
#3   Pakistan 10,571 
 
#8   Yemen 
 
3,145 
#4   India 6,348 
 
#9   Thailand 
 
2,395 
#5   Philippines 3,898 
 
#10   Libya 
 
2,233 
 
                                                      
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. (Notably, Syria is the eleventh most affected country by terrorism, experiencing 2,052 attacks from 2010-
2017.  Though ISIS occupied swaths of northern and eastern Syria, much of the local carnage has been the product 
of actions taken by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and the Syrian military). 
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Terrorism is a Global Problem.  In recent years, terrorist activity has reached record 
frequency levels and continued to spread to more countries around the world (see Figure 4).  
Today, more than 100 countries are affected by terrorism within their borders, signaling that 
while terrorism may be concentrated among hotspots, it has an expansive global reach. 
 
Figure 4.  Number of Countries That Experienced a Terrorist Attack (1970-2017) 
 
Note: Data are shown by year.  Source: Global Terrorism Database.43 
 
 
The number of countries that experienced a terrorist attack grew steadily from 1970-
1990, increasing from 33 to 84 countries at an average annual growth rate of 4.5%.  However, 
from 1990-1992, the number of countries affected by terrorism rose rapidly from 84 to 141 at an 
average annual growth rate of 29.6%.  Though this dramatic surge largely remains an anomaly, it 
was partially aided by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which produced 15 post-Soviet states.  
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The number of countries affected by terrorist attacks remained above 100 until 1998, when the 
figure began to subside.  After a six-year staggered decline, in 2004, the number of countries had 
dropped to 55, the lowest amount since 1977.44  However, consistent with the resurgence of 
global terrorist activity after 2004, more countries began to be affected by terrorist attacks 
around the world. 
Since 2004, the number of countries that experienced a terrorist attack has grown 
consistently with the exception of 2008-2010, when global terrorism briefly contracted.  This 
growth continued until 2016 when the number of countries affected by terrorism reached 106, a 
19-year high.45  Combined, more countries experienced at least one attack and one terrorism-
related death in 2016 than at any other point since data was first collected in 1970.46  
Interestingly, the spread of global terrorism occurred while the total number of terrorist attacks, 
fatal attacks, and terrorism-related fatalities collectively declined.  While the number of attacks 
dropped by 35% and fatalities dropped by 41% from 2014-2017, the number of countries 
affected by terrorism remained similar or higher.  This means that over the past three years, 
terrorist activity experienced a disproportionately high geographic presence. 
 
Conclusion 
 Terrorism is not a new phenomenon.  For centuries, individuals and organizations have 
used violence to pursue or achieve political goals.47  Terrorism is also not confined to a particular 
ideology or motivation.  Organizations and attacks have been inspired by extremism on all kinds.  
                                                      
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 “Global Terrorism Index 2017.” Institute for Economics & Peace, November 2017, 41, 
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf. 
47 Ganor, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,” 13. 
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Over the past 140 years, terrorist activity has generally occurred in four distinct waves.  
Beginning in 1880, the majority of terrorism was motivated by anarchism, followed by 
nationalism in 1920, and communism in 1960.  Notably, the life cycle of each wave has been 
contained within a 40-year time frame.  However, the fourth wave is on pace to break that trend.  
Not only will religiously motivated terrorism soon become the longest-lasting, it has also already 
introduced exponentially higher levels of violence.48  Like its predecessors, the Religious Wave 
of terrorism will eventually expire, although it is unlikely to reach its conclusion anytime soon. 
 Before 9/11, little importance was placed on the collection and analysis of terrorist 
activity, especially from an academic perspective.  As a result, policymakers and practitioners 
were left uninformed when they needed it the most.  Since, institutions in both the public and 
private sectors have made significant strides in terrorism research.  With the creation and 
curation of open-source databases such as the GTD, researchers are now able to trace the global 
trends and trajectories of terrorism and create opportunities for informed decision-making. 
 Through careful analysis of GTD data, several conclusions can be made about the 
history, status, and future of global terrorism.  First, terrorism ebbs and flows.  Since 1970, 
global terrorist activity has experienced periods of growth and decline, but it has recently surged 
to unprecedented levels.  Second, terrorism occurs in hotspots.  These highly concentrated areas 
are disproportionately affected by terrorism and produce the majority of global terrorist activity.  
Third, terrorism hotspots move over time.  Whereas terrorism was once produced primarily in 
Europe and South America, it now plagues the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.  Fourth, 
terrorism is expanding globally.  With attacks occurring in 100 countries around the world, 
terrorism has demonstrated growth in both global reach and intensity. 
                                                      
48 Ibid. 
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In each of these analyses, there is a reoccurring theme: since the onset of the Global War 
on Terror, terrorism has evolved, exhibiting distinctive characteristics and defining trends.  In the 
eighteen-year history of the Global War on Terror, terrorist attacks have reached record levels in 
frequency and produced an unprecedented number of fatalities; terrorist hotspots have grown in 
intensity and spread to new continents; Iraq and Afghanistan have become epicenters of 
terrorism and are now victims of the most non-state terrorist violence in human history; and 
terrorist activity continues to expand globally and affect additional countries.  Though a 
definitive, causal relationship cannot be tested or proven, it is safe to assert that the Global War 
on Terror has not succeeded in defeating terrorist organizations, denying them sanctuary, or 
diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit, three goals defined in the 
2003 White House National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism.49  Collectively, the presented 
data not only defines the status quo of the global threat landscape, but also provides key insights 
into the trajectories of terrorism in the 2020s, signaling that the terrorist threat is becoming 
increasingly dangerous, dynamic, and difficult to defeat.50 
  
                                                      
49 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” The White House, February 2003, 15, 17, 22, 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. 
50 Ibid., 25. 
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EMERGING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES 
 
Introduction 
Despite nearly two decades of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations, the strain of religious 
terrorism that has been popularized by al-Qaeda and ISIS is no closer to being defeated.  In fact, 
it has only become more popular and more difficult to combat.  A November 2018 study 
estimates that there are nearly four times as many jihadist militants today as there were on 
September 11, 2001.51  The study, published by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, calculates that there are now approximately 230,000 active jihadist militants in nearly 70 
countries around the world.  Though groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have not been able to launch 
an attack anywhere near the scale of 9/11 since that day, the ideology that leads someone to fly a 
plane into a building seems to have metastasized.52   
The Global War on Terror will soon enter its third decade and, while the U.S. and its 
allies have certainly demonstrated tactical advantages on the battlefield, terrorist groups continue 
to recruit and grow in record numbers.  Though there are likely many contributing factors, one 
theory to explain why some terrorist groups have prospered is that counterterrorism officials 
have privileged tactical success at the expense of long-term strategies that address the future of 
terrorism.  Meanwhile, terrorist organizations have been adapting to routine counterterrorism 
efforts and developing countermeasures of their own.  Though extensive research is required, 
only by identifying and understanding these emerging strategic challenges can counterterrorism 
officials can be better prepared to combat terrorism in the 2020s.  
                                                      
51 Seth G. Jones et al., “The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
November 2018, 9, https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat. 
52 Eric Schmitt, “Two Decades After 9/11, Militants Have Only Multiplied, The New York Times, November 20, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/terrorism-islamic-militants.html. 
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The Formation of International Alliances 
In her book Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, Dr. Tricia Bacon asserts 
that today’s greatest terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are the alliances they 
are building with other terrorist groups.53  A former analyst at the U.S. State Department’s 
Bureau of Counterterrorism, Dr. Bacon has been exploring the formation of terrorist networks 
for nearly 14 years.  She notes that alliance-building among terrorist groups is not a new 
development; in fact, it has been embraced by groups throughout history.54  However, the 
complex networks of alliances that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have been forging are 
historically unique and have allowed their organizations to withstand prolonged counterterrorism 
pressure. 
It is important to note initially that these strategic partnerships extend beyond ad hoc 
transactions, which are the primary means of cooperation between terrorist groups and criminal 
organizations.  Instead, there is protracted cooperation between terrorist groups and their leaders, 
and an expectation that there will be continued consultation and coordination in the future.55  
Through a comprehensive examination of comparative case studies, Dr. Bacon has determined 
empirically that terrorist organizations that have these types of partnerships survive longer than 
those that do not, as they are able to pool their resources in order to recover from significant 
setbacks.  They also tend to be more ambitious and lethal in their operations, and are more likely 
to seek weapons of mass destruction.56 
                                                      
53 Tricia Bacon, Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2018, 3. 
54 Tricia Bacon, “Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances,” New America, filmed on June 21, 2018, 
YouTube video, 1:34:15, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/events/why-terrorist-groups-form-
international-alliances/. 
55 Bacon, Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, 7. 
56 Bacon, “Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances.” 
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Dr. Bacon has also determined that alliances are beneficial to terrorist groups because 
they underpin their organizational health.  They allow smaller groups to improve their cachet, or 
reputation, which often leads to the acquisition of tangible resources, such as money and recruits.  
They also allow groups to develop new operational skills or become more efficient or effective at 
things they are already doing.57  Moreover, they allow groups to adjust their agendas and 
rejuvenate support, particularly when their original cause begins to wane in terms of its 
resonance.  They also allow terrorist groups to better withstand counterterrorism pressure, 
especially when their partners can provide safe haven.58  A prime example of this is the 
protection the Taliban gave to al-Qaeda within its sanctuary in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  However, perhaps the most valuable benefit of terrorist alliances is that groups can 
share best practices and lessons learned.  The reality of such cooperation has been made clear by 
declassified documents recovered from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 
which revealed that al-Qaeda’s central leadership was providing tactical and strategic guidance 
to its partners, including advice on how it has learned to avoid or evade U.S. drone strikes.59 
Dr. Bacon explains that, for many terrorist groups, alliances are formed when 
organizational survival becomes not just a means of accomplishing their aspired objectives, but 
an end unto itself.60  She writes, “Thinly veiled beneath terrorists' declared aims is their belief 
that they are the ones, perhaps the only ones, who can right the perceived wrongs and precipitate 
the sought-after change.  In other words, terrorist organizations see themselves as indispensable 
to achieving the change they seek.  Consequently, victory depends on organizational survival.”61  
                                                      
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Bacon, Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, 4. 
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However, terrorist groups inherently pursue competing missions.  On the one hand, they seek to 
stage a violent revolution to achieve social or political change.  On the other, they seek to exist 
and survive.  Progress toward their political or social objectives, however, does not guarantee 
organizational survival.62  In fact, it often complicates their organizational health.  As 
organizations carry out operations in pursuit of their objectives, they attract increasing 
counterterrorism pressure.  Therefore, one of the primary reasons terrorist groups form 
international alliances is to compensate for their activities and improve their chances of survival. 
Though alliances are critically important for terrorist organizations’ endurance, the U.S. 
has, thus far, failed to disrupt their formation—even though doing so has been a policy priority 
for over fifteen years.63  As early as 2003, U.S. counterterrorism strategy asserted, “The 
interconnected nature of terrorist organizations necessitates that we pursue them across the 
geographic spectrum to ensure that all linkages between the strong and the weak organizations 
are broken, leaving each of them isolated, exposed, and vulnerable to defeat.”64  While the U.S. 
has used counterterrorism tactics that overlap with an effort to deter the formation and success of 
new terrorist groups, such as designating and sanctioning terrorist organizations and their 
affiliates, it has not operationalized a specific, concerted strategy to disbanding the alliances 
themselves.65  As a result, networks of international terrorist alliances have continued to expand 
and grow, and show no signs of dissipating on their own.  
                                                      
62 Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic, “Beyond Convergence: World Without Order,” Center for Complex 
Operations, National Defense University, October 2016, 202, 
https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%
20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170. 
63 Bacon, “Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances.” 
64 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 9. 
65 “Tricia Bacon Discusses Her New Book About Terrorist Alliances,” American University School of Public 
Affairs, filmed on May 31, 2018, YouTube video, 52:37, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Fd2b8ybRNQ. 
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While alliance building allows terrorist groups to become more resilient, Dr. Bacon 
contends that the process actually signals they are suffering from an underlying weakness.  In her 
book, she writes, “Terrorist groups look to form these alliances when they are organizationally 
weak in terms of their skills, knowledge, or ability to mobilize resources.  They experience these 
problems and they cannot address them on their own.  Rather than being a sign of strength, it is 
fundamentally a sign of weakness.”66  Yet, the U.S. and its international counterparts have been 
unable to identify and exploit these weaknesses and unsuccessful in disrupting terrorist group 
alliances once they are formed.  Therefore, the lesson for policymakers is to disrupt alliances at 
an early point, when they are most vulnerable.67  Otherwise, alliances will continue to be built 
and terrorist organizations will continue to become more resilient, lethal, and ambitious. 
Instead of only facing the threat of terrorism from individual organizations, the world 
now faces danger from competing terrorist networks, made up of malevolent groups who have 
rallied behind the perceived successes of organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.  
Smaller groups have pledged their allegiance to these organizations largely because very few 
other groups have the ability to supply the appropriate funding, training, safe haven, or prestige 
they desire.  Consequently, resource-rich terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
emerge as preferable partners and become hubs around which other groups cluster.68  Though 
terrorist alliances and networks share many distinct qualities, no two are the exact same.  
Therefore, in order to understand network compositions, is it important to analyze them 
individually. 
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67 Ibid. 
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The al-Qaeda Network.  Al-Qaeda has benefited significantly from the Islamic State’s 
absorption of counterterrorism resources.  While the U.S. and other global leaders have largely 
focused their attention on ISIS, al-Qaeda’s central command in Pakistan, often referred to as al-
Qaeda core, has expanded its operations throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  Fostered 
by political uprisings during the Arab Spring, al-Qaeda has developed a network of franchises in 
countries characterized by civil unrest and social instability.69  In Yemen and parts of Saudi 
Arabia, al-Qaeda has united groupings of Sunni militias to grow its regional affiliate, al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a highly lethal franchise that has directed attacks against 
Western diplomatic facilities throughout the Persian Gulf.70  In Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and 
Niger, al-Qaeda has also absorbed a number of smaller extremist groups to develop its regional 
affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which poses the primary transnational terror 
threat throughout the Sahara and Sahel.71  In addition to expanding the geographic range of its 
operational command, al-Qaeda has formed strategic partnerships with other terrorist 
organizations.  In exchange for training and funding, a number of domestic terrorist 
organizations, including the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Shabaab in Somalia, have pledged 
their allegiance to al-Qaeda.72   These franchises and alliances have allowed al-Qaeda to expand 
its operations throughout 18 countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and steadily grow a 
more sustainable regional influence (see Figure 5).73 
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Figure 5.  The International al-Qaeda Network 
 
Note: Countries in which al-Qaeda and its affiliates have active operations.  Source: Reuters.74 
 
 
Al-Qaeda’s rapid expansion has largely been the result of forming mutually beneficial 
partnerships with smaller, pre-existing groups.  By adopting the al-Qaeda brand, local militias 
garner legitimacy among extremists, enhancing their abilities to recruit and finance.  Meanwhile, 
these strategic partnerships allow al-Qaeda to access new markets, establish diverse footholds, 
and expand its regional influence.75  Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is still responsible for charting 
a strategic course for the network, but it empowers its regional commanders and local partners to 
conduct operations as they see fit.76  Consequently, as its network has become increasingly 
decentralized, al-Qaeda has grown more resilient.  Not only do the interconnected affiliate-to-
affiliate relationships allow its partners to share best practices, they also ensure that al-Qaeda 
will survive even if its core leadership does not. 
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The failure to properly understand how the al-Qaeda network operates has confused the 
global strategy to combat it.77  First, there is no group at the heart of the network.  Al-Qaeda’s 
“central” command continues to outline a strategic direction for the network, but it no longer 
issues directives.78  Therefore, operations that only focus on decapitating al-Qaeda’s leadership 
in Pakistan will have a limited effect on the overall network.  Second, the lateral connections, or 
relationships, between al-Qaeda groups create a lattice-like structure that gives the network its 
strength.79  Therefore, the U.S. and its international allies must place a renewed focus on 
exploiting inter-group cooperation and groups’ ability to share resources.  Third, though many of 
al-Qaeda’s affiliates operate solely on a local level, they fundamentally strengthen the broader al-
Qaeda network.  Therefore, counterterrorism officials must develop a comprehensive, global 
strategy to counter al-Qaeda that is also tailored to combat each of their local assets.80 
Tactical successes against al-Qaeda have not succeeded in weakening its overall network.  
Instead, al-Qaeda will be more expansive in 2021 than it was at the beginning of 2011 or 2001.  
The organization has evolved over the last two decades and developed a complex, adaptive, and 
resilient network that continues to grow.  The heart of the organization is now its structure, 
which is composed of interconnections between al-Qaeda’s affiliates and allies.81  Only by 
understanding how each group contributes to the al-Qaeda network can policymakers develop a 
comprehensive strategy to defeat al-Qaeda.  Absent that understanding, the U.S. and its allies 
will continue to engross themselves in tactical engagements that promise battleground victories, 
but no real prospect of winning the greater war.82  
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The Islamic State Network.  In order to understand the dynamic nature of the Islamic 
State network, it is imperative to first recognize the inception and evolution of the group we 
know today.  Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, al-Qaeda established an affiliate 
organization in Iraq to fight against coalition forces.  The affiliate, known as al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), was led by a Jordanian extremist named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he was killed by a 
U.S. airstrike in 2006.83  After Zarqawi’s death, AQI was renamed the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) 
and capitalized on the country’s instability to grow its membership.  Over the next four years, ISI 
recruited local Sunni militias to join its fight against the U.S.-backed, Shia government in Iraq.  
In 2010, an Iraqi national and former U.S. detainee named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the 
leader of ISI and, shortly after he assumed power, a civil war began in the neighboring country 
of Syria.84  Seeking to expand its ranks, in 2011, ISI helped to establish an al-Qaeda branch in 
Syria, known as Jabhat al-Nusra, to launch attacks and rebel against the Syrian government.  
Two years later, in 2013, Baghdadi announced that he was seizing command of Jabhat al-Nusra 
to form a new group named the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a decision that was 
explicitly rejected by al-Qaeda leaders.85  Following a series of ISIS attacks on Muslim 
communities and fearing that the ruthless brutality of ISIS would tarnish its brand, in February 
2014, al-Qaeda renounced its ties to Baghdadi and ISIS; however, this split had little effect on 
the rapid growth of the organization.  By October 2014, ISIS had seized approximately 81,000 
square miles of land in Iraq and Syria, a territory larger than the size of Great Britain.86 
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The schism between al-Qaeda and ISIS demonstrates that not all terrorist alliances last 
forever.  It also reveals key vulnerabilities within the framework for alliance building.  First, it 
demonstrates that shared enemies and common ideologies do not, by themselves, permanently 
bind terrorist group alliances.  Though these factors may guide partner selection, alliances are 
dependent on mutually beneficial opportunities to obtain new skills, knowledge, or capacities for 
resource acquisition.87  Second, it shows that (at least some) leaders of terrorist organizations are 
conscious of how public perception will affect their organizational goals—and that personal 
relationships among leaders can outweigh mutual interests.  Third, it highlights that in any 
conflict or insurgency, there will be competing groups that vie for the same resources and 
recruits.  This was certainly the case between Afghan Mujahideen groups during the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and continues to fuel battles between insurgent groups fighting in the 
Syrian Civil War today.88  This competition can create inter-organization rivalries within the 
conflict at large and may have lasting ramifications for terrorist organizations’ future 
relationships with one another.89 
Rivalries between terrorist groups can also have prolonged and unforeseen consequences.  
In order to compete with the growing al-Qaeda network—and to compensate for territorial 
setbacks in Iraq and Syria—the Islamic State has aggressively expanded its area of operations.  
In the Middle East, the Islamic State has established regional affiliates, which it refers to as 
wilayats, or provinces, in Saudi Arabia and Yemen; groups that have benefited significantly from 
sectarian conflicts in their respective countries.  In North Africa, it has also established footholds 
in Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, which are among the Islamic State’s fastest growing provinces.  
                                                      
87 “New Book Examines How Terrorist Groups Become Allies.” 
88 Ibid. 
89 “Tricia Bacon Discusses Her New Book About Terrorist Alliances.” 
 36 
Though each of these groups now fights under the unified banner of the Islamic State, many had 
already worked with one another before the emergence of ISIS.  In fact, nearly all of the Islamic 
State’s provinces were formed by adopting groups that splintered from al-Qaeda’s affiliates.90 
Furthermore, the Islamic State has convinced some of al-Qaeda’s allies to abandon its 
network, including the notorious Nigerian terrorist organization, Boko Haram.  Formerly a 
strong ally of AQIM, Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015—the same 
year it was ranked as the world’s deadliest terrorist group by the Global Terrorism Index91—and 
changed its name to the Islamic State in West Africa.92  Outside of the Middle East and Africa, 
the Islamic State has developed a province in the Caucasus, a region in Eastern Europe, as well 
as provinces in several South Asian countries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.  
Several provinces have also been established in Southeast Asia through international alliances.  
Domestic terrorist groups in Indonesia and Sri Lanka have carried out attacks on behalf of the 
Islamic State, and in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group have pledged their 
allegiance and carried out vicious campaigns to establish independently governed territory.93  
Like the Filipino groups and ISIS before it, each of the Islamic State’s provinces is dedicated to 
carving out territory within their respective regions that can then be occupied and expanded; a 
vicious process that leaves a trail of excruciating violence.  Today, the Islamic State has a 
network of active provinces in at least 13 countries around the world, as well as a number of 
smaller, but growing, cells (see Figure 6).94  
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Figure 6.  The International Islamic State Network 
 
Note: Countries in which the Islamic State and its provinces have active operations. 
 
 
Moreover, the Islamic State is still an active threat in Iraq and Syria.  In March 2018, the 
Islamic State lost control of the last sliver of territory it once held in Iraq and Syria.95  However, 
their territorial losses should not be mistakenly characterized as an enduring defeat.  ISIS has 
now transitioned into an active clandestine organization and is acting as an insurgency in both 
countries.  Furthermore, instead of fighting to the death to defend their occupation of territory, 
thousands of ISIS militants retreated to the rural borderlands straddling Iraq and Syria, where 
they have found refuge in sympathetic communities.96  In fact, the Pentagon estimates that ISIS 
has between 20,000-30,000 members divided roughly equally between Iraq and Syria,97 and is 
well positioned to regroup and rebuild its dominion.98  In the 2020s, it is likely that these 
harbored individuals reorganize and reconstitute either ISIS itself or something similar to it.  
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Though it is currently experiencing territorial setbacks in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State will 
undoubtedly rebound, relying on its global network of provinces to take more responsibility and 
keep its brand relevant.  More worrying still is that the regeneration process seems to produce 
even more potent threats.  Similar to the transformation from AQI to ISIS, “ISIS 2.0” could 
emerge as a more dangerous and dynamic threat than what dramatically materialized in 2014.99 
Summary.  As the Islamic State develops its provinces and al-Qaeda's affiliates 
persevere despite prolonged counterterrorism pressure, it has become imperative to understand 
both how and why terrorist groups from international alliances.100  Not only have these networks 
allowed senior terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to expand their area 
of operations, they have also supplied smaller groups with the financial and material resources 
they need to grow.  As a result, new terrorist group alliances have begun to rapidly emerge 
across the world, reinforcing the resilience of both terrorist networks and the global jihadist 
movement.  Moreover, despite nearly two decades of counterterrorism operations, al-Qaeda and 
the Islamic State have only become more popular and more difficult to combat.  As a result, the 
U.S. has found itself engaged in an extended game of cat-and-mouse, in which the greatest 
military known to man chases a growing phenomenon.  In order to prevent the prosperity of 
terrorism, rather than simply react to it, the U.S. and its allies must place a renewed focus on 
disrupting terrorist group alliances, denying space for affiliates to emerge, and deterring the 
growth of international terrorist networks.   Otherwise, terrorist organizations will continue to 
expand and grow, becoming more resilient, lethal, and ambitious in the process. 
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The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon 
As the Islamic State seized territory in Iraq and Syria, it attracted thousands of foreign 
nationals to join its ranks.  However, now that it has lost all of its territorial control, many of 
those foreign nationals have either returned home or relocated elsewhere.  A 2017 study 
conducted by The Soufan Center estimates that over 40,000 foreign nationals from more than 
110 countries traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS.   These individuals left their homes and, in 
some cases, relocated their families to fight for an alternative to nationalism.  When they joined 
ISIS, they expected to expand its regional occupation.  However, as coalition forces definitively 
liberated its once-held lands, ISIS’s foreign fighters have been forced to decide between fighting 
until their deaths or feeling from the battlefield.  Though some have chosen to stay and fight, 
many of have fled Iraq and Syria by any means possible.  Their desperation became especially 
evident in September of 2017 when more than 300 ISIS fighters surrendered their weapons and 
boarded buses departing from a former Syrian stronghold.101  However, the deportation of these 
radicalized fighters will not remove the threat they pose; it will merely transport that threat from 
one location to another.  As ISIS transitions to its next phase, the world is starting to grapple with 
a serious problem: thousands of the foreign nationals who migrated to Iraq and Syria to fight for 
ISIS are returning home or relocating elsewhere; and, as the number increases every day, the 
likelihood of containing their violent ambitions within the borders they have fled is becoming 
wishful thinking, at best.102 
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Analysis of Returning and Relocating Foreign Fighters.  The Islamic State’s well-
crafted propaganda and exploitation of political mistrust have allowed for the geographical range 
of its appeal and membership to reach well beyond Iraq and Syria.  In fact, only 30% of the 
40,000 documented foreign fighters migrated from countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa.103  The composition of the remaining 28,000 foreign fighters is rather diverse.  More than 
8,700 of ISIS’s foreign fighters are natives of Russia and former republics of the Soviet Union, 
which represents the highest number of documented foreign fighters from a particular region.104  
Over 5,750 foreign fighters traveled from Western European countries to fight for ISIS, while 
another 1,500 migrated from Southeast Asia.  The Western Hemisphere was not immune to the 
ISIS’s recruitment, either: 444 documented individuals from North America traveled to Iraq or 
Syria to fight for the terrorist group (see Figure 7).105 
Despite the rush of foreign fighters that poured into Iraq and Syria after ISIS declared its 
caliphate—an independent territory governed by strict Islamic law—on June 29, 2014, the flow 
of foreign fighters slowed significantly, and eventually halted, when it began to lose its territorial 
control.106  Consequently, as their caliphate collapsed, thousands of ISIS fighters abandoned their 
pseudo-state and returned home.  In October 2017, The Soufan Center estimated that at least 
5,600 foreign fighters from 33 countries had already returned to their native homelands—and 
that number has continued to grow daily.107  Added to these figures is the unknown number of 
foreign fighters who have returned to countries that have failed to document their arrival or 
simply lost count. 
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Figure 7.  Origins of ISIS Foreign Fighters 
 
Note: Countries and regions with the highest numbers of documented ISIS foreign fighters.  
Source: The Soufan Center.108 
 
 
There are several reasons why ISIS foreign fighters may have decided to return to their 
home countries.  Some may have become disillusioned or remorseful and wanted to return to 
their former lives.  Others may still be driven by the ideology but decided to escape Iraq and 
Syria to avoid their foreseeable death.  More alarming, some may have been sent home to plan or 
execute an attack, or felt they could do more for the jihadist movement at home than abroad.109  
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Other foreign fighters have chosen to relocate to new countries, rather than return to their 
homelands.  This is especially true in the Middle East and North Africa, where countries with 
porous borders provide safe haven for extremist migrants.110  Countries in Southeast Asia have 
also seen an influx of foreign fighters who are unable or unwilling to go home.111  As thousands 
of foreign fighters relocate around the world, many are believed to be searching for new 
battlefields.112  Inevitably, some foreign fighters will remain committed to the ideology that al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State have popularized.113  Instead of attempting to reintegrate into 
society, these individuals may look for the next jihadist cause.  With sectarian violence occurring 
throughout the Eastern Hemisphere, they will have several theaters from which to choose.   
Foreign fighters may choose to transfer to another one of the Islamic State’s provinces, 
which continue to grow in strength and numbers around the world.114  They would undoubtedly 
be welcomed there by like-minded confederates.  Radicalized, yet relocating because of ISIS’s 
defeat, they could also find refuge in al-Qaeda’s international network.  Al-Qaeda has been 
known to recruit trained members of other jihadist organizations in order to grow its 
membership.  In fact, the group was founded on that very strategy.  During the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden created a training base for thousands of foreign fighters who 
traveled to Afghanistan to defend the Muslim country.  The base, which in Arabic translates to 
al-Qaeda, became the breeding grounds for the emerging terrorist organization’s recruitment.115  
Today, al-Qaeda may seek to lure fleeing ISIS foreign fighters into becoming its newest 
recruitment class, providing human resources to strengthen its competing international network. 
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When assessing the threat posed by today’s foreign fighters, refer to the havoc caused by 
those who fought in the Soviet-Afghan War.  During the ten-year war, which lasted from 1979- 
1989, approximately 20,000 foreign fighters traveled to Afghanistan.  After the Soviets 
withdrew, some of the foreign fighters—one of whom was Osama bin Laden—went on to form 
al-Qaeda and carry out lethal attacks on Western targets.116  Comparatively, from 2013-2016, 
approximately 40,000 foreign fighters traveled to Iraq and Syria.  The difference: ISIS attracted 
twice as many foreign fighters in less than a third of the time.  Though the foreign fighters who 
fought in Afghanistan were energized from victory and those in Iraq and Syria are recovering 
from defeat, the latter’s potential to regroup, recruit, resurge, and recreate what they have lost 
should be underestimated—especially with their ability to communicate today.117  A March 2018 
UN report states that ISIS’s foreign fighters are likely to be “the most operationally experienced, 
lethally skilled, and highly networked group of foreign fighters to date.”118 
Any foreign fighter who wishes to continue fighting will find a way to do so.  As the 
Islamic State navigates its future, its leadership will likely be looking to its trained foreign 
fighters to keep its brand alive.119  This may very well result in a surge of terrorist attacks that are 
carried out on its behalf.  Between 2014 and 2016, the perpetrators of 38 of the 42 terrorist 
attacks carried out in Western nations were connected to or inspired by the Islamic State.120  
Although only 18% of attackers were known foreign fighters, the attacks they carried out were 
among the most lethal, leading to an average death toll of 35 fatalities per attack.121  
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Legal Challenges for Returnees.  Though the international community agrees that ISIS 
alumni will pose a serious threat for decades to come, they have not reached a consensus on how 
to best handle those who have returned.  Most countries have established legal frameworks for 
prosecuting and incarcerating returning foreign fighters; however, once incarcerated, they often 
attempt to radicalize other inmates and develop recruitment networks within the prison system.  
Some countries have focused on developing reintegration programs, which are notoriously 
difficult to design and run.122  Others have chosen to deny legal responsibility for their native 
foreign fighters by stripping them of their citizenship, which can complicate international law. 
There is also a subset of returnees that is even harder for nations to address: the women 
and children who traveled to Iraq and Syria or, in the case of some children, were born in ISIS’s 
caliphate.123  Though some women willfully joined ISIS and directly participated in terrorism-
related offenses, others were brought to Iraq and Syria by their spouses and assumed the roles of 
non-combatants.  As these women have returned to their native countries, prosecutors have been 
challenged with distinguishing the level of individual participation.  Moreover, from 2014-2016, 
ISIS is believed to have taught more than 2,000 boys between the ages of nine and fifteen how to 
use weapons and kill.124  Added to this number are those younger than nine who have been 
indoctrinated through propaganda and educational materials that have desensitized them to 
violence and dehumanized their perceived enemies.  As these children return or relocate, they are 
in desperate need of proper mental health treatment and deradicalization programming to 
successfully rehabilitate and reintegrate into society.125 
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United States Policy.  To manage foreign fighters that hold U.S. citizenship, the U.S. has 
relied on its criminal justice system, primarily charging foreign fighters with providing material 
support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.  According to The Soufan Center, more 
than 250 Americans attempted to join ISIS, 129 of whom successfully reached Iraq and Syria.126  
Of the 129 foreign fighters, researchers at George Washington University’s Program on 
Extremism have tracked 12 who have returned to the U.S., nine of whom have been arrested and 
charged with terrorism-related offenses.  The remaining three have not faced charges due to lack 
of sufficient evidence of their activity in Iraq and Syria, a hurdle that continues to complicate 
convictions around the world.127  As of March 2019, 177 individuals have been charged in the 
U.S. with terrorism-related offenses for their interactions with the Islamic State and 125 have 
been convicted, resulting in an average sentence of 13.4 years.128  Many of these 177 individuals 
were arrested while attempting to make the journey to Iraq and Syria—some of whom 
successfully made it abroad, only to be detained and extradited back to the U.S.  However, 57 of 
these individuals were directly involved in plots to carry out attacks on U.S. soil.129 
Although prosecutions are undoubtedly a necessary first step, they alone are an 
insufficient measure to respond to American foreign fighters.130  In addition to convicting foreign 
fighters of their crimes in federal court, the U.S. government needs to develop complementary 
responses, especially in the U.S. prison and parole systems.  Currently, there are no 
deradicalization or disengagement programs targeted toward incarcerated terrorists in the U.S. 
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federal prison system.131  In this regard, the U.S. lags behind many other Western nations.  The 
status quo—allowing individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses to serve out sentences 
without any intervention—is lousy, solely relies on the deterrent effect of prison sentences, and 
ignores the potential for both recidivism and further radicalization.132  Like many other current 
counterterrorism policies, this approach sacrifices long-term strategy in favor of short-term 
solutions; a style of policymaking that has allowed terrorist groups to survive and succeed. 
Summary.  In total, more than 40,000 foreign nationals traveled to Iraq and Syria to join 
ISIS.  Of those, at least 5,600 have already returned home—and that number continues to grow 
by the day.  Added to these figures is the unknown number of foreign fighters who have returned 
to countries that have failed to document their arrival or simply lost count.  Thousands of foreign 
fighters have also chosen to relocate to new countries, rather than return to their homelands; 
many of whom are suspected to be looking for new theaters of war.  The exodus of foreign 
fighters will undoubtedly pose a significant threat to international security as thousands of 
individuals who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State disperse throughout the world, 
transporting their radical ideologies and combat training with them.  Historically, foreign fighters 
have played a critical role in creating new terrorist groups, strengthening existing ones, and 
radicalizing and recruiting their future peers.133  Moreover, the potential for ISIS foreign fighters 
to plan or conduct attacks in their home countries is a growing threat that will challenge national 
security and law enforcement entities for years to come.  However, what to do with foreign 
fighters when they return or relocate is less certain.  The complexity of this whole-of-society 
issue will only add to the strategic challenges that ISIS foreign fighters will pose in the 2020s.  
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The Emergence of Cyberterrorism 
For years, terrorist groups have used the internet to spread propaganda, recruit operatives, 
and inspire lone-wolf attacks.  However, they are now expanding their digital horizons beyond 
mere social media and messaging platforms; they are slowly developing cyber warfare 
capabilities to rival those of state actors.134  Terrorist groups have long used unconventional 
means to pursue their goals and drive their agendas; they embrace guerilla tactics to counter 
conventionally superior foes.  So, it comes as no surprise that they are now pursuing offensive 
cyber weapons to spread fear and uncertainty, finance their operations, and promote their 
brand.135  Cyberspace is a profound equalizer—it allows small groups to compete on the same 
playing field as corporations and governments.  Additionally, because the internet can facilitate a 
strong degree of anonymity, cyber-terrorists are able to tailor their operations to project their 
desired amount of exposure.  Subtle penetrations can be used to gain information and resources, 
while disruptive attacks can foster notoriety and fear.  The threat of a cyberattack, however, is 
not limited to the domain it exploits.  The information and wealth acquired from cyberattacks can 
be used to inform battlefield strategies and fund physical attacks, as well.136  In order to harness 
these advantages, several terrorist organizations have developed units devoted to offensive cyber 
activity.  Others have outsourced their technical work, relying on hackers-for-hire to fulfill their 
cyber ambitions.  Consequently, although terrorist groups have been thus far unable to conduct a 
major computer network attack, the gap between their aspirations and capabilities is quickly 
closing. 
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Cyberterrorism, Defined.  Cyberterrorism is commonly defined as “the unlawful attack 
or threat of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein to intimidate 
or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.”137  Unlike 
cybercriminals or hacktivists, cyber-terrorists’ intentions involve more severe, permanent 
damage, which may include loss of life or severe economic collateral.  Cyber-terrorists are 
especially complex adversaries.  They not only seek to exploit valuable data and information but 
also to impair critical infrastructure in an effort to disrupt social order.  They do not fear reprisal 
and, in many cases, seek to fundamentally destabilize society by undermining its technological 
dependency.138 
In cyberspace, a threat actor is an adversary who has the motive, means, and opportunity 
to impact an individual or organization by exploiting a vulnerability in such a way that risk is 
transformed into a measurable loss or harm.139  In order to analyze the threat of cyberterrorism, it 
is important to explore these definitional qualities, as well as the methods that terrorists have 
used in the past and could plausibly use in the near future. 
Motives.  Terrorist groups aspire to inflict harm, create chaos, and disrupt services in the 
nations and organizations they oppose.  They are increasingly motivated to adopt defensive cyber 
capabilities, such as encryption applications and anonymity tools, to evade law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies.  They are also actively developing offensive cyber warfare capabilities, 
such as malware or spyware, to damage networks, disrupt operations, and divert resources, and 
to gather information, generate revenue, and grow their influence. 
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Methods.  Terrorist groups have been unable to effectively penetrate the networks that 
control critical security infrastructure.  However, they have been practicing.  According to a 
2015 report published by the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, each year, 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies record a rising number of cyber-terrorist attacks, 
which have typically fallen into one of three categories:140 
 
• Defacement: The attacker gains access to a website by exploiting misconfigurations or 
vulnerabilities, and replaces the original content with propaganda or a claim of credit.  A 
motivated attacker may also delete files from the compromised server or upload malware.141 
 
• Data Breach: The attacker breaks into a secured database to access, download, and in some 
cases publicize the private information contained within.  The attacker may infiltrate the 
target system directly by finding security flaws in the database infrastructure or indirectly 
through social-engineering attacks such as phishing, which take advantage of human error.142 
 
• Denial of Service (DoS): The attacker renders a website inaccessible by overwhelming it 
with traffic.  A DoS attack can be launched from a single computer, but its effectiveness 
increases with the number of computers engaged, as it is harder for cybersecurity systems to 
handle malicious traffic from multiple IP addresses.  Those launched from multiple machines 
are referred to as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.143 
 
 
Moreover, as cyber weapons proliferate and tech-savvy recruits multiply, terrorist groups will 
continue to strengthen their cyber arsenals.  This will allow individuals and organizations to 
carry out more sophisticated attacks, such as: 
 
• Ransomware: The attacker uses propagating cyber weapons that scale and replicate 
automatically, allowing one string of code to potentially dismantle a high number of 
networked systems or infrastructure.  These attacks can be deployed with the push of a button 
and, depending on their configuration, can often be deactivated just as easily.  This allows the 
attacker to hold the system for ransom and then release it upon receiving payment.144 
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Since mid-2015, known terrorist operatives have been discussing the potential use of 
ransomware on popular hacking forums on the dark web—part of the internet that is invisible to 
standard search engines and can only be accessed through the use of an anonymizing browser.  
Ransomware is particularly advantageous for terrorist organizations because it could provide a 
mode of both disrupting social order and raising financial resources.  Given the accumulating 
costs that ransomware produces, especially when it disrupts critical infrastructure such as 
hospitals or transportation hubs, corporations and governments may be coerced into meeting the 
demands of terrorist organizations.  The potential for a terrorist organization to acquire and 
launch a ransomware attack is not illusory.  Preconfigured cyber weapons are not very difficult 
to obtain and do not require much technical expertise to deploy, and there are clear aspirations 
within terrorist organizations to expand their offensive cyber capabilities using malevolent cyber 
weapons.145 
Means.  There is a plethora of ways that terrorist groups can acquire cyber weapons.  
Dark web forums and marketplaces make malware and technical expertise widely available.  
From discussing useful exploits and attack vectors to gaining anonymity tips and operational 
know-how, these underground chat rooms provide a form of customer service for terrorists who 
are aspiring to carry out cyberattacks—and, with plenty of hackers-for-hire and malware for sale, 
refined technical skills are no longer a requirement.  Moreover, through their publication of 
classified documents, WikiLeaks has made an abundance of hacking tools available to the public 
and has exposed cyber vulnerabilities that terrorist organizations may very well attempt to 
exploit.146 
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With a modest budget, setting up properly layered cyberattacks is relatively easy; all one 
needs is a target and a reason.147  Well-funded terrorist organizations can easily outsource more 
sophisticated attacks.  Hacking-as-a-service is a growing industry and criminal groups could 
wittingly or unwittingly act on behalf of terrorist groups, for the right price.148  Terrorist 
organizations could also purchase preconfigured and potent cyber weapons to exploit or attack 
networked infrastructure, or exfiltrate personal data from the U.S.’s virtually unprotected internet 
of things (IoT).149  They can also conduct smaller, less-sophisticated cyberattacks that are more 
of a nuisance than a major threat but compliment other activities.  Terrorist organizations can 
launch centrally coordinated attacks, or they can provide inspiration, guidance, and instruction 
for cyber-savvy lone-wolves.  Terrorist organizations can also recruit individuals who may not 
have strong cyber skills but have physical access to Western assets that would otherwise be 
difficult to hack. 
For example, in 2016, German authorities monitoring a jihadist forum on the dark web 
discovered a plot to attack the network of a Berlin financial institution.  A janitor who worked 
the overnight shift at the corporation had planned to load malware provided by an ISIS-linked 
hacker onto a USB device and plug it into one of the institution’s computers, which would have 
allowed the ISIS affiliate to remotely hack into its network.150  This insider threat has become a 
grave concern for corporations and governments alike, and will likely continue to grow in 
popularity among terrorist groups in the years to come. 
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Growing Terrorist Group Capacity.  A number of terrorist organizations are practicing 
their cyber skills, and some have already demonstrated the means to carry out offensive 
cyberattacks: 
Al-Qaeda.  In a 2012 video, al-Qaeda declared its intentions to conduct "electronic jihad" 
against the U.S., and compared vulnerabilities in vital American computer networks to the flaws 
in aviation security before the 9/11 attacks.  In the video, an al-Qaeda operative calls upon the 
"covert mujahidin," a term al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups have used to inspire lone-wolf 
terrorist attacks, to launch cyberattacks on U.S. government networks and critical infrastructure, 
including the electric grid.151  Moreover, senior U.S. military officials have warned that al-Qaeda 
operatives are actively pursuing advanced cyber weapons to stage crippling attacks against U.S. 
networks and could purchase the capabilities to do so from expert criminal hackers.152   
Hamas.  In 2017, Hamas operatives successfully managed to hack the cell phones of 
dozens of Israeli soldiers.  Hamas created fake social media profiles pretending to be young 
women and persuaded dozens of Israeli soldiers to download a fake dating app on their mobile 
devices, which in effect proved to be a vehicle to install malware.  This allowed Hamas to 
monitor their calls, texts, and emails to obtain information on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units, 
training exercises, and operational plans.153  Hamas directed a similar ploy in June 2018 using an 
app that tracked World Cup scores, which they advertised in Hebrew on Facebook.  Once the 
malicious app was installed, it granted Hamas the ability to track IDF soldiers’ locations and use 
the phone as both a listening device and video camera.154 
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Hezbollah.  As Iran continues to develop its cyber warfare capabilities, Hezbollah is 
expected to be a major beneficiary.  Increasing evidence suggests that Iran is looking to commit 
cyberattacks against the U.S. and Israel.  Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism may take on a new 
dimension in cyberspace, where it could develop a powerful cyber weapon and pass it on to its 
ally, Hezbollah, to launch on its behalf. 155  This would not only allow Iran to avoid direct 
attribution but would also provide Hezbollah with the opportunity to bolster its legitimacy. 
The Islamic State.  The Islamic State has demonstrated the capacity to deploy a wide 
variety of offensive cyber weapons.  The terrorist group has launched a number of doxing 
campaigns, through which they sought to uncover personally identifiable information (PII) 
related to security or military personnel, publicize that information, and encourage others to 
conduct physical attacks against those individuals.156  In 2015, an ISIS-linked hacker published 
personal data of more than 1,300 U.S. military and government officials, including names, 
addresses, and other sensitive information, as a “kill list” to inspire lone-wolf attacks against 
those individuals and their families.157  While the lasting ramifications remain uncertain, at least 
one individual living in the U.S. has been indicted for using the information to plan an attack.158 
In a few instances, the Islamic State has demonstrated more sophisticated cyber 
capabilities, such as the use of malware and preconfigured cyber tools.  In 2013, ISIS operatives 
sent spear-phishing emails to opposition groups in Raqqa, Syria, which contained hidden 
malware.  When the emails were opened, they returned the victim’s IP address and geolocation 
information to ISIS operatives, which they later targeted during their invasion in 2014.159  
                                                      
155 Cloherty, “Virtual Terrorism.” 
156 Mark Pomerleau, “How ISIS Harnesses Commercial Tech to Run Its Global Terrorist Network,” C4ISRNET, 
August 15, 2017, https://www.c4isrnet.com/show-reporter/dodiis/2017/08/15/how-isis-harnesses-commercial-tech-
to-run-its-global-terrorist-network/. 
157 Maxey, “When Terrorists Learn How to Hack.” 
158 Ibid. 
159 Scott and Spaniel, “The Anatomy of Cyber Jihad,” 10. 
 54 
Moreover, in December 2016, ISIS hackers launched a volley of DDoS attacks against 
government targets in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Iraq, resulting in the disruption of several 
servers that hosted confidential information.160 
Perhaps the Islamic State’s most significant cyber capability, however, is its potential to 
inspire lone-wolf cyber-terrorist attacks.  The Islamic State operates what can best be described 
as a 24-hour help desk, staffed by tech-savvy recruits around the globe.  Operatives are available 
to address technical questions, such as how to send encrypted messages or how to leverage one’s 
physical access to facilities to launch cyberattacks.  They also share tutorials and tools with 
aspiring cyber-terrorists, and try to recruit other tech gurus to join their ranks.161   
In the past, ISIS-inspired cyber-terrorists have frequently resorted to website defacement, 
particularly targeting government sites.  In January 2015, an ISIS affiliate successfully hacked 
the U.S. Central Command’s Twitter account and posted a number of tweets and pictures about 
the growing technological capabilities of the Islamic State.162  In June 2017, a number of U.S. 
government websites were also defaced with messages in support of ISIS.163  Defacements, 
which are relatively simple from a technical standpoint, remain the most common type of cyber-
terrorist attack; however, not all who hack for the Islamic State launch such elementary attacks.  
The Islamic State has also formed alliances with a number of sophisticated hacking collectives 
who possess considerable cyber capabilities.  These groups have launched cyberattacks that have 
incapacitated Arab media outlets and, in 2016, one group that pledged its allegiance to ISIS 
successfully infiltrated NASA’s public network and attempted to seize command of a drone.164 
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The Prospect of a Cyber 9/11.  As modern societies have become increasingly 
dependent on technology to improve government and corporate efficiencies, the potential 
damage of a major cyberattack has become increasingly destructive.  Today, a major cyberattack 
can compromise the stability of medical, food, and water systems, disrupt transportation, or even 
destabilize nuclear plants.165  In fact, the Department of Homeland Security’s National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) recently warned that there is a “narrow and fleeting 
window of opportunity before a watershed, 9/11-level cyberattack” is attempted against critical 
U.S. infrastructure.166  It is likely only a matter of time before a major cyber-terrorist attack 
targets the U.S. power grid, communications systems, or financial institutions; however, the 
means to respond remain uncertain, as many of the most sensitive systems operate under 
independent, private sector control.167 
Although terrorist organizations have explicitly expressed their ambitions to conduct a 
major, 9/11-style cyberattack, they have been unable to do so thus far.  Counterterrorism and 
cybersecurity experts have sponsored dozens of studies, held numerous panel discussions, and 
written countless articles on the topic.  They widely agree that while many have warned of 
cyberterrorism targeting critical infrastructure, such operations are far more complex than any 
cyber-terrorist attack to date and require a deep understanding of the physical engineering of 
these systems.168  Some suggest that the perceived difficulty of attacking U.S. networks deters 
terrorist organizations from going to such lengths when they have alternative, physical means 
that have been proven to incite fear and generate publicity.  Another possibility is that 
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cyberattacks do not meet terrorist groups’ preferences for strong visual effects.169  However, 
make no mistake; as the global community becomes more dependent on networked 
infrastructure, terrorist groups will continue to hone their cyber skills.  Although terrorist groups 
have yet to conduct a major computer network attack, the gap between their aspirations and 
capability is quickly closing. 
Summary.  Terrorist groups are arming themselves with the technical tools and expertise 
needed to attack the networked systems that stabilize Western governments, companies, and 
critical infrastructure.  Although they are not known for being particularly sophisticated in their 
use of technology beyond social media and encrypted messaging services, terrorists are 
aggressively seeking ways to bridge gaps in their technical knowledge.  Terrorist groups are 
actively recruiting tech-savvy operatives and procuring advanced cyber weapons to wreak havoc 
on modern society.  Because cyberspace is a profound equalizer, terrorist groups are able to 
compete on a level playing field with corporations and governments, providing an elevated 
posture for an already dangerous enemy.  Moreover, cyberterrorism is a serious threat and one 
that will only continue to grow and hyper-evolve.  Although to date, the cyberattacks launched 
by terrorist groups have lagged behind those of state actors in both sophistication and scale, the 
potential danger they pose should not be overlooked.  Unless corporations and governments react 
to preempt the threat of cyberterrorism, it is only a matter of time before terrorist organizations 
match their abundant will to carry out crippling cyberattacks with the appropriate means to do so.  
A major cyberattack could be just around the corner and officials should never (again) make the 
mistake of underestimating terrorist organizations or the type of weapons they may use. 
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Conclusion 
The Global War on Terror will soon enter its third decade and, while the U.S. and its 
allies have demonstrated tactical advantages on the battlefield, there are nearly four times as 
many jihadist militants today as there were on September 11, 2001.  Over the past eighteen 
years, the counterterrorism community has learned a number of lessons, but so too have terrorist 
groups.  They are now adapting to routine counterterrorism tactics and developing 
countermeasures of their own.  Today, terrorist organizations are building international alliances 
that enable their groups to share resources and withstand counterterrorism pressure; foreign 
fighters are dispersing across the globe and have the potential to form new terrorist groups, 
strengthen existing ones, or carry out lethal attacks of their own; and terrorists are pursuing 
offensive cyber weapons that are capable of crippling critical infrastructure.  The diversity and 
severity of these threats will only add to the challenges counterterrorism officials will soon face.  
In order to prevent the prosperity of terrorism, rather than simply react to it, the U.S. must place 
a renewed focus on the issues that will test counterterrorism in the years to come.  Thus, by 
identifying and understanding emerging strategic challenges, such as the formation of 
international alliances, the foreign fighter phenomenon, and the emergence of cyberterrorism, 
counterterrorism officials will be better prepared to combat terrorism in the 2020s. 
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OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS FOR U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
 
Introduction 
In response to 9/11, the U.S. quickly constructed a counterterrorism strategy that was 
focused on removing the safe haven al-Qaeda used to plan their attack.  Within three months, 
U.S. troops entered Afghanistan, drove the Taliban from power, and forced al-Qaeda to flee.  
Though the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began with a quick and decisive victory, prolonged 
counterinsurgency operations and failed nation-building set an ineffective standard for twenty-
first-century counterterrorism.  Eighteen years later, the War in Afghanistan endures; now the 
longest war in American history and often characterized with no end in sight. 
Despite a cost of nearly six trillion dollars and the loss of nearly 7,000 U.S. military 
service members,170 the Global War on Terror continues to underpin U.S. counterterrorism—
even though the term itself has become archaic.  For nearly two decades, the U.S. has relied on 
the same military-centric strategy that has proven itself unable to resolve complex foreign policy 
issues around that globe.171  With military engagements in countries throughout the Middle East, 
North Africa, and South Asia, the U.S. has found itself stuck in a perpetual stalemate: unable to 
make progress against global terrorism but unwilling to give up. 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy is now in dire need of a paradigm shift, a fundamental 
change in its approach and expectations.  Many of the conflicts that comprise the Global War on 
Terror are fueled almost entirely by local sectarian strife, meaning there is little that a Western 
country and its military can actually do on the ground to influence outcomes for a sustained 
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period of time.172  Though comprehensive military campaigns may be necessary instruments to 
combat terrorist organizations staging an insurgency or occupying land, they should not be the 
backbone of U.S. strategy.  Instead, the U.S. should place a renewed focus on undermining 
terrorist groups’ abilities to recruit and finance, and thereby regenerate and survive.  Prioritizing 
such initiatives can lead to long-term success, unlike the game of cat-and-mouse that has become 
the Global War on Terror.  Otherwise, U.S. counterterrorism efforts will continue to spiral, 
fighting today’s enemy while creating tomorrow’s. 
 
Refining the Role of Law Enforcement 
 Before 9/11, U.S. counterterrorism was led by law enforcement and geared toward 
prosecution.  Consistent with its traditional law enforcement approach, the FBI investigated 
international terrorist attacks in order to develop criminal cases against the conspirators.  
However, the FBI was also highly involved in preventing foreign-born attacks on U.S. soil.  
Though proactive counterterrorism investigations required extensive resources, the FBI was 
often successful in thwarting attacks, and many of the perpetrators of these plots were arrested, 
prosecuted, and convicted.173 
 On September 11, 2001, the FBI was limited in several areas that are critical to effective, 
proactive counterterrorism operations.  Agents and analysts who worked on counterterrorism did 
so despite limited intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, a restricted capacity to share 
information both internally and externally, insufficient counterterrorism training, overly 
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complicated legal boundaries, and inadequate human resources.174  However, in the eighteen 
years since, many of these limitations, as well as those identified in the 9/11 Commission Report, 
have been addressed.  Law enforcement has been granted new legal authorities, intelligence 
gathering has been positively reformed, information sharing has improved, counterterrorism laws 
have been updated or created, and the FBI’s counterterrorism division has multiplied in size 
many times over.  The FBI and its federal law enforcement counterparts are now equipped with 
the tools they need to lead successful counterterrorism investigations and U.S. counterterrorism 
strategy greatly benefits from their involvement. 
 Exploiting the Crime-Terror Nexus.  Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
decline of state-sponsored terrorism, organized criminal activity has become a major revenue 
source for terrorist groups worldwide.175  Building on the precedent set by narco-terrorism in the 
1980s, terrorist organizations in the 1990s began to rely on profitable crimes such as drug 
trafficking to finance their operations.176  Over the past 20 years, the nexus between crime and 
terror has grown stronger, and the emergence of international terrorist organizations and 
transnational organized crime have demonstrated that two traditionally separate phenomena have 
many operational and organizational similarities.177  Today, terrorist organizations appear to be 
learning from one another’s criminal endeavors, adapting to each other's successes and failures, 
and expanding their collective modus operandi.  Therefore, it has become imperative for 
policymakers to acknowledge and understand the crime-terror nexus in order to formulate 
effective counterterrorism strategies and combat these evolving and converging threats.178 
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 Terrorist groups operate much like street gangs.  They are made up of loosely affiliated 
cells that can act autonomously, rather than the rigid chains of command commonly associated 
with traditional insurgent groups.  They attract marginalized youth who are looking for a sense of 
purpose, most of whom are males in their late teens or early 20s.  They market themselves as 
providers of social identity, protection, status, excitement, and emotional fulfillment.179  Both 
terrorist groups and street gangs broadcast their violence to bolster their group’s reputation, 
display dominance over rivals, intimidate local residents, and establish territorial borders.  
Moreover, in keeping with the practices of profit-oriented gangs, terrorist groups have 
transitioned from conventional crimes such as robbery and extortion to more intricate exploits 
such as human and drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, and cybercrime.180 
Like gangs, terrorist organizations are inherently criminal.  Because they depend on 
criminal activity to finance their operations, law enforcement is uniquely positioned to 
undermine them.  Financing is essential for any organization to sustain its activities, and terrorist 
networks are no different.181  Both small terrorist groups and international terrorist organizations 
such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State rely on illicit finance to fund their training, payroll, and 
overhead.  Though terrorist attacks themselves are relatively low-cost compared to the damage 
they inflict, the operational costs of sustaining a terrorist organization are significant.182  As a 
result, terrorist organizations must exercise diverse methods of raising and laundering money. 
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However, the money trail they leave cannot only provide clear criminal evidence for an 
effective prosecution but also serve as an efficient way to identify, interdict, and isolate terrorist 
organizations and their financiers.183  Determining how, when, where, and from or to whom 
money has been transferred are reliable data points that law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies can use to map out terrorist organizations, identify individual and organizational 
facilitators, and disrupt their activities.184  Though tracking down, rounding up, and arresting 
members of terrorist organizations is a worthy endeavor, dismantling a terrorist group’s financial 
support structure can significantly reduce its strength and effectiveness, leaving its workforce 
unproductive and its operations unsustainable.  Illicit finance is the lifeblood of international 
terrorist networks.  Therefore, implementing aggressive initiatives directed by law enforcement 
and designed to detect, disrupt, and deter terrorist finance can lead to the dissipation of the 
networks that foster and fund global terrorism.  In fact, according to research, efforts like these 
from law enforcement are some of the most effective means of defeating terrorist organizations. 
How Terrorist Groups End.  All terrorist groups eventually end, demonstrating that, for 
the most part, terrorist groups are impermanent adversaries.  The fact that they are transient, 
however, raises several important questions.  How have terrorist groups been defeated in the 
past?  Is there a statistical significance, meaning their defeats can be attributed to a specific cause 
or causes?  If so, what are the most common?  In order for the U.S. to construct an effective 
counterterrorism strategy, policymakers must first find answers to these questions and 
understand through what measures and under what circumstances terrorist groups have 
historically come to an end.  With this information, they will have a better understanding of what 
has been successful in the past and what will likely be effective in the future.  
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The overwhelming majority (66%) of terrorist organizations dissolve within the first year 
(see Figure 8).  Only a third last long enough to celebrate their first anniversary and only a 
quarter experience their second.185  Though the likelihood of organizational survival declines as 
groups age, there remains a significant number that makes it to their tenth year and beyond.  
Around 9% of terrorist groups survive at least a decade, signaling that the groups that reach this 
threshold have developed a resilience that is difficult to resolve.  This echoes a familiar 
assessment made by Dr. Tricia Bacon, who contends that terrorist groups are most vulnerable in 
the early stages of their development and more difficult to combat after reaching seniority.186 
 
 
Figure 8.  Life Spans of Terrorist Groups (1970-2016) 
 
Note: Data are shown in years.  Data are partially represented as cumulative to demonstrate the 
total percentage of terrorist groups that remained in operation over time.  Data are partially 
represented as non-cumulative to demonstrate the exact percentage of terrorist groups that 
remained in operation for the exact number of years shown.  Source: Global Terrorism 
Database.187 
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Moreover, a recent study conducted by the RAND Corporation investigates the reasons 
why terrorist groups end.  By analyzing a roster of terrorist organizations that existed worldwide 
between 1968-2006, RAND researchers were able to pinpoint the primary cause of each 
organization's dissolution (see Figure 9).188  Additionally, they were able to determine how a 
group’s ideology and size affected organizational survival.  In this regard, they found that, 
historically, religiously motivated terrorist groups have taken longer to eliminate than other 
groups and that groups exceeding 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25% of the 
time—two characteristics shared by both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
The RAND study shows that a total of 648 terrorist organizations were active at some 
point between 1968-2006.  Of those organizations, 268 ended definitively, 136 splintered into 
other groups, and 244 remained active as of 2006.189  The study determined that the most 
common reason groups stopped committing terrorism is because they became a non-violent 
political party.  In fact, 43% of groups that ended between 1968-2006 reached peaceful political 
accommodation with their respective governments.190  However, simply verifying a terrorist 
group as a political party does not necessarily end their terrorist activity outright.  Hezbollah 
holds numerous seats in Lebanon’s parliament but continues to support and conduct terrorism. 
Moreover, 10% of terrorist groups ended because their goals were achieved; though that 
is not to say they were directly responsible for the overall success.  An example is the National 
Liberation Front, which ceased all terrorist activities after Algeria achieved independence from 
France, but whose terrorist activities were insufficient in achieving such results on their own.191  
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The study also found that military force has rarely been the primary reason a terrorist group has 
ended, effective in only 7% of cases.  This has profound policy implications for the Global War 
on Terror, which, for two decades, has been at the forefront of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.192 
 
 
Figure 9.  How Terrorist Groups Have Ended (1968–2006) 
 
Note: Data are shown as percentages of the 268 terrorist groups studied.  Source: RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents.193 
 
 
Interestingly, 40% of terrorist organizations have ended as a result of policing.  In fact, 
for organizations that cannot or will not abandon terrorism to achieve their goals, policing is 
likely the most effective counterterrorism tactic.194  Operations conducted by police and 
intelligence agencies have been significantly more effective than the use of military force and 
even rival the success rate of political accommodation.  Though this may come as a revelation to 
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some policymakers, it is logically quite simple.  Police and intelligence services are better fit to 
disrupt terrorist finance, allowing them to combat terrorist groups in a way that military forces 
traditionally cannot.195 
The RAND study concludes that policing is a highly effective component of international 
counterterrorism and should receive greater attention in U.S. strategy.  It contends that 
organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are made up of interconnected networks of 
individuals and organizations across multiple continents that need to be systematically identified 
and investigated.196  While a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy requires layering a range 
of policy instruments, including public diplomacy, police and intelligence work, and targeted 
military operations, policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts and where 
finite resources are best spent.  According to the results of this study, police and intelligence 
efforts are far more effective in defeating terrorist groups than brute military force, a revelation 
that has significant policy implications for post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy. 
Strengthening International Counterterrorism Capacity.  U.S. law enforcement 
cannot be expected to police global terrorism on its own, however.  In order to strengthen 
international counterterrorism capacity, foreign law enforcement agencies must take an active 
role, as well.  Fortunately, the U.S. is able to provide assistance to foreign police and intelligence 
agencies to enhance their ability to “deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in 
international terrorist acts.”197  In 1974, the U.S. Congress adopted §660 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, prohibiting the U.S. from providing law enforcement training and internal 
security assistance to foreign governments—namely, through the use of the U.S. military.  
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However, a 1983 amendment allows the U.S. to provide training and equipment to foreign law 
enforcement as long as it relates to the detection, deterrence, or prevention of terrorism.198 
Strengthening partnerships with foreign law enforcement agencies is critically important.  
It not only allows for greater information sharing but also improves apprehension and detention 
efforts.  Local police and intelligence know the language, people, culture, and terrain better than 
U.S. agencies.  They are also able to build lasting internal security measures.  However, they can 
benefit from U.S. resources.  U.S. law enforcement can assist local agencies in building cases 
and advise foreign governments on criminalizing activities that are necessary for terrorist groups 
to function, such as illicit finance.  By strengthening these partnerships, U.S. law enforcement is 
able to work “by, with, and through” local agencies, making efforts by both entities more 
effective.199  Improving foreign agencies’ capacity to counter terrorism within their borders 
inherently increases U.S. security and creates opportunities for sustainable success.200 
Summary.  We cannot eliminate the threat of terrorism any more than we can eliminate 
crime.  We can, however, mitigate it.201  By strengthening international partnerships and 
constructing new initiatives focused on combating terrorist finance, U.S. law enforcement can 
make a meaningful difference in disrupting global terrorism.  Illicit activity is the lifeblood of 
international terrorist networks, and law enforcement is uniquely equipped with the tools and 
authorities to investigate and isolate their assets.  Though U.S. and international law enforcement 
entities will likely require additional resources to reach their full effectiveness, they remain one 
of the most effective means of definitively defeating terrorist organizations.  
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Charting A Path Toward Delegitimization 
 In addition to increased participation by U.S. and international law enforcement agencies, 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy can benefit from new initiatives that focus on undermining the 
ideology that fuels twenty-first-century terrorism.  Frankly, groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State cannot be permanently defeated by war.202  Nearly two decades of experience demonstrates 
this.  War has failed to undermine the ideology and sever the support structures that allow 
terrorist groups to survive.  In fact, evidence suggests it acts as a negative force multiplier.  With 
an estimated four times as many jihadist militants today as there were on 9/11, the U.S. must 
seriously reconsider the lasting effects of the Global War on Terror being the centerpiece of its 
counterterrorism strategy.203 
Terrorist organizations are not formal military structures like national armies that can be 
defeated by traditional warfare.  They are largely decentralized and amorphous.  Their human 
resources are usually desperate and aggravated youth who are frustrated by political participation 
and have given up on the possibility of peaceful political change.204  Most of these individuals 
are from countries that lack democracy and basic human rights, including freedom of speech.  In 
their frustration, these individuals become convinced that violence is the only way to make their 
voices heard and bring about change.205  This explains why al-Qaeda resurged after the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, why ISIS emerged during the ruins of the Arab Spring, and why widespread 
civil war has produced domestic terrorist groups that have destroyed progress toward peaceful 
and positive developments throughout the Eastern Hemisphere.206 
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As long as terrorist organizations are able to market themselves as righteous and effective 
forces for change, they will continue to recruit and replenish any forces they lose.  It is for this 
reason why, despite tremendous financial and human resources, the U.S. and its allies’ military 
victories are largely short-lived.  When one terrorist is captured or killed, another takes his or her 
place—if not two or three more—allowing terrorist organizations to regenerate and survive.  
Unfortunately, this has been the unintentional product of misguided counterterrorism; strategy 
that focuses heavily on direct military engagements but often ignores that larger ideological war. 
Deterrence by Delegitimization.  To suffocate the seemingly endless supply of recruits, 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy should implement policies aimed at delegitimizing terrorism.  
Delegitimization is a strategy that seeks to eliminate the ability to justify behavior, thereby 
reducing its popularity.  In terms of counterterrorism, it seeks to strengthen and spread opinions 
that contradict the legitimacy or justification of violent extremism.207  The objective of this 
strategy is to persuade individuals who are contemplating or participating in terrorism to alter or 
abandon their activity on the basis that they can no longer justify the ideology or tactics.  Like 
conventional deterrence, delegitimization attempts to change an adversary's behavior; however, it 
does so by degrading the rationales that inform terrorist violence, rather than by punishment or 
denial.208  Delegitimization is an effective, long-term deterrent that can be used to challenge 
perverse religious interpretations, magnify the repugnance of terrorist violence, and recognize 
the innocence of its victims.  It can also be used to erode the authority of terrorist leaders or the 
efficacy of terrorism itself. 
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Groups’ Center of Gravity.  The target market of a delegitimization strategy should be 
an organizations’ center of gravity, a concept developed by Carl Von Clausewitz in the 1800s 
that is still relevant in today’s operational environments (see Figure 10).209  The U.S. Department 
of Defense defines an organization’s center of gravity as the source of power that provides its 
moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.210  In terms of terrorism, a group’s 
center of gravity is made up of several tiers of support that provide both moral and physical 
defense for the organization’s tactics, ideology, and membership.  The deeper a group’s center of 
gravity, the more legitimacy it has.  Therefore, for delegitimization to be successful, it must first 
erode the lower levels of support before climbing the tiers that maintain the organization itself. 
  
 
Figure 10.  A Terrorist Group’s Center of Gravity 
 
Source: Missouri State University, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies.211 
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Damaging the legitimacy of an adversary is accomplished by persuading its 
sympathizers, passive and active supporters, and potential recruits that the organization and its 
leadership are unattractive and unworthy of supporting or joining.212  When this is accomplished, 
a terrorist’s center of gravity will begin to shrink, allowing it to become more vulnerable to 
defeat.  However, post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy has largely ignored these fundamental 
support structures.  Instead, it has been too narrowly, and at times exclusively, focused on the 
removal of active members and leaders of terrorist groups.  As a result, when a terrorist 
organization losses members and suffers a setback, supporters and sympathizers who want to see 
it succeed often offer to take a more active role, providing the additional human resources that 
allow terrorist groups to regenerate and survive. 
Constructing Counter-Narratives.  To chart a path toward delegitimization and erode 
terrorist groups’ centers of gravity, counterterrorism officials must utilize a network of methods 
that are designed to discredit terrorist participation.213  These methods must be centered around 
carefully constructed counter-narratives, consistent messaging that deconstructs terrorist 
propaganda and promotes positive alternatives using compelling arguments that resonate with 
potential recruits.214  For counter-narratives to be effective, they must appeal to terrorist 
prospects more strongly than terrorism itself.215  This means that counter-narratives must address 
their most significant personal concerns and propose effective alternatives to terrorist violence. 
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Terrorist groups often seek to exploit local grievances that, in many cases, have a 
legitimate basis, including political oppression, poverty, and persecution.  To combat their 
recruitment, effective counter-narratives must include positive messaging that promotes 
community solidarity and peaceful avenues for addressing conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism.216  Moreover, counter-narratives should expose and refute the flaws and hatred that 
comprise terrorists’ appeals.  These arguments should address the same concerns that terrorists 
seek to exploit and propose alternative avenues for conflict resolution, justice, and 
empowerment.217  However, to craft messaging that resonates with would-be terrorists, 
counterterrorism officials must understand all aspects of the radicalization cycle, including not 
only why people are attracted to joining these groups but also why some have chosen to quit.218 
Why Terrorists Quit.  Numerous individuals have decided to drop out of terrorist 
groups and studying their motivations to quit is very useful for crafting effective counter-
narratives.219  Some have chosen to leave after becoming disillusioned with the group’s ideology 
or tactics.  Others have departed because they no longer believed in the group’s leadership.  
Some have decided to quit because they have been influenced to do so by family or friends,220  
while others have reconsidered their commitment after being confronted in combat.  Yet, some 
have even cited more petty grievances, such as poor living conditions and unfair pay.221 
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Though each of these motivations differ in terms of aggravation and influence, they all 
demonstrate proven opportunities for disengagement and should be utilized in forming effective 
counter-narratives.  First, counter-narratives should undermine the authority and legitimacy of 
leaders of terrorist groups.222  These narratives should portray leaders as flawed and cruel, rather 
than idolized Western targets—the latter of which became an unintended consequence of the 
global pursuit to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.  Second, counter-narratives should 
characterize terrorists as criminals who fail to live by just and reasonable principles.223  When the 
violence terrorist organizations facilitate resembles mere thuggery, their objectives become 
suspect and their supporters unnerved.224  Third, counter-narratives should magnify the reality 
that terrorist groups intentionally target and kill innocent civilians in their attacks.225  Groups like 
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are astutely aware that terrorist attacks are deeply unpopular with 
a vast majority of those with whom they claim to defend and in whose religion they claim to 
act.226  Therefore, counter-narratives should broadly communicate the cruelty of terrorism and 
defend religious and community leaders who contradict and condemn its use.  Fourth, counter-
narratives should focus on the difficult, financially unstable, and fear-filled life of a terrorist.227  
The life of a terrorist is neither glamorous nor comfortable.  There is often infighting regarding 
poor living conditions and disparities in pay, as well as the persistent paranoia of being captured 
or killed.  Communicating these frequent troubles to prospects can demonstrate just how 
unattractive it is to be a terrorist.  
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Yet, just as important as the message is the messenger.  We know that counter-narratives 
are more likely to be effective if they exploit and emphasize real contentions.  It is for this reason 
why studying individual disengagement is so important.  However, they are also more likely to 
be effective if they are communicated by individuals who know firsthand what motivates 
individuals to join—and quit—terrorist groups.  Therefore, there are no better orators for these 
counter-narratives than former extremists, individuals who can communicate their personal 
experiences and rationales before joining, while participating, and after quitting.  Former 
extremists have a unique understanding of the radicalization and deradicalization processes and 
are capable of constructing compelling arguments that resonate with potential recruits.  Their 
leadership can also serve as an example, enabling existing extremists to imagine a life after 
terrorism and apart from their organizations.228 
Summary.  Bombs, bullets, and boots on the ground may kill terrorist fighters, but they 
will not kill the ideology fueling their struggle.229  If the U.S. and its allies want to eliminate 
groups like al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and all of their manifestations, it must begin to chart a 
path toward delegitimization.  Delegitimizing an organization or ideology is undeniably difficult.  
It requires a deliberate and persistent, coordinated campaign that will likely take years to bear 
fruit.  However, it is undisputedly worthwhile.  A successful delegitimization strategy results in 
not only the dissipation of terrorist groups who subscribe to the targeted ideology, but also a 
fundamental unraveling of the ideological movement itself.  Delegitimization is an effective, 
long-term deterrent to radicalization and should be what any comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy strives to achieve. 
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Marginalizing Terrorists Online 
 While the U.S. and its allies have been fighting terrorism from the air and on the ground, 
terrorist organizations have established a foothold in a new domain.  Over the past twenty years, 
terrorist groups have adopted advanced asymmetric warfare capabilities and wielded what is 
perhaps the most dangerous technology to date: the internet.  With all eyes on the greater Middle 
East, the counterterrorism community has largely neglected terrorist groups’ online insurgencies, 
which are far more difficult to counter than physical conquests and produce unpredictable ripples 
of violence.  Online, terrorists are shielded from the counterstrikes that would typically force 
them to flee their strongholds.  Instead, they have planted digital roots with an understanding that 
they are welcome to stay as long as they would like. 
Terrorist groups know their strengths and weaknesses.  They are also aware of those of 
their adversaries.  Instead of consolidating their efforts on the battlefields, where they know they 
will be inevitably confronted by superior lethal force, terrorist groups have made a strategic 
decision to exploit online platforms, where they can mitigate risk and do far more global 
damage.  Through burgeoning social media and digital communication platforms, terrorist 
groups have been able to communicate, construct plots, coordinate attacks, claim credit, and 
convince others to join their ranks.  These platforms have become their primary distribution 
channels for propaganda, their preferred recruitment pipelines, and a modern requirement for 
international terrorist operations.  Therefore, it has become imperative for U.S. counterterrorism 
strategy to recognize and counter these online insurgencies.  Preventing terrorist groups from 
dominating digital territory will reduce their public exposure, restrict the replenishment of their 
ranks, and destroy their most fundamental means of external communication.230  
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Removals and Suspensions.  Terrorist groups have leveraged the invention, growth, and 
evolution of social media platforms to distribute their content to audiences across the world.  
Some smaller social media platforms, often idealistic about free speech and ignorant of terrorists’ 
efforts to incite violence, have turned a blind eye to removing terrorist content.  As a result, 
terrorists have been afforded anonymity, enabled to exchange ideas, and allowed spread 
propaganda with minimal interference.  Terrorist groups have also heavily utilized popular 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, where they can radicalize and recruit a much 
larger audience.  Although these larger platforms have strict terms of service that they regularly 
enforce, they are consistently plagued with so much nefarious content that they have difficulties 
removing it all in a timely manner.  Recent U.S. Congressional hearings have pressured both 
small and large platforms to take a more active role in identifying and removing terrorist 
propaganda; however, the process unavoidably resembles an online game of whack-a-mole, as 
terrorist operatives create new accounts and upload content faster than the platforms can 
recognize, review, and remove the malicious material.231 
Despite being the most popular tactic to counter online terrorist activity, removing 
content and suspending accounts has not been an effective deterrent.  When terrorists’ accounts 
are suspended, most simply create a new one, proclaiming their newfound notoriety and renewed 
resolve.  Others migrate to more hospitable platforms such as Telegram or WhatsApp, which 
offer encryption.232  However, both of these outcomes are equally troubling.  Those who remain 
online despite numerous suspensions become influencers in the online terrorist community and 
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have often used their status to mobilize foreign fighters or incite homegrown attacks.233  On the 
other hand, those who move from open to encrypted platforms can no longer be monitored by 
law enforcement and, although they are no longer broadcasting content in popular public forums, 
they remain able to communicate in online ideological echo chambers with relative impunity.234 
Although removing terrorist propaganda as quickly as possible is preferred, poorly timed 
account suspensions can complicate law enforcement investigations.  Law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies often monitor flagged social media accounts, which can produce valuable 
intelligence, allow authorities to intervene before an attack, and lead to arrests and prosecutions.  
When those accounts are suddenly suspended during an investigation, law enforcement loses 
visibility and is left uninformed.  Therefore, law enforcement and social media companies can 
benefit from establishing strong working relationships to facilitate communication regarding 
ongoing investigations and persons of interest. 
Moreover, law enforcement and intelligence agencies can use account activity to map 
terrorist groups’ virtual networks.235  By tracing account interactions and identifying where 
identical content is posted, law enforcement and intelligence agencies can distinguish which 
accounts are posting the original content first, therefore likely belonging to the terrorist group, 
which accounts are rapidly disseminating it, likely belonging to members and supporters, and 
which accounts are merely engaging with it, likely individuals who may not be directly affiliated 
with the group itself, but display an active interest and attraction to their propaganda.  Such an 
understanding can also create opportunities for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
covertly infiltrate online terrorist networks and identify their ringleaders: the recruiters.  
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 To combat the presence and prevalence of online terrorist recruitment, counterterrorism 
efforts should target recruiters’ willingness to operate in the open.236  For example, law 
enforcement can work with the news media to aggressively publicize arrests that result from 
online sting operations.  If every new account a recruiter interacts with carries the risk of 
belonging to an undercover agent, it becomes exponentially more hazardous to recruit new 
members.237  Similarly, law enforcement can publish material showing how much intelligence 
can be gathered on a suspected terrorist and his or her associates simply from their online 
activity.  This content demonstrates that the investigation of a single user’s account can lead to 
many arrests, thereby telling the cautionary tale that maintaining an active presence online can 
lead to the arrest of both the recruiter and his or her entire online network.238 
The Redirect Method.  In addition to combatting those who are producing online 
terrorist content, an effective counterterrorism strategy should address those consuming the 
information, as well.  To its detriment, a reliance on account suspensions has undercut efforts to 
offer flagged users off-ramps to extremism, such as counter-narratives.239  Since users can set up 
new accounts in seconds, suspensions are not an effective deterrent to consuming propaganda.  
They also fail to recognize the root of the problem.  Consumers of terrorist content are online 
answer-seekers; individuals who are intentionally reading or watching terrorist propaganda to 
inform their worldview.  They are fundamentally hungry for knowledge.  Therefore, an effective 
counterterrorism strategy should focus on feeding these individuals with an abundance of 
wholesome content that effectively dilutes the toxicity of online terrorist propaganda and allows 
individuals to build up antibodies to extremism. 
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 To expose consumers of online terrorist propaganda to sober, opposing viewpoints, the 
counterterrorism community should work with private sector partners to develop a 
comprehensive communications plan that broadcasts custom counter-narratives.  First, the 
coalition will need to construct content that resembles what the consumer is seeking.  The 
content should not blatantly denounce terrorism or a particular terrorist group, especially at first 
glance, or else the intended consumers will not engage with it.240  Instead, by replicating the 
styles of existing terrorist propaganda and crafting headlines that draw the consumer’s interest, 
the content will likely have a high engagement rate from the audience it seeks to attract.  Next, 
the coalition should use targeted online advertising to reach individuals who have previously 
searched for similar substance and suggest viewing the curated content that debunks terrorist 
recruitment messaging.241  This strategic advertising can help mitigate the number of consumers 
who have repeatedly searched for and engaged with terrorist content and redirect them to custom 
counter-narratives, providing individuals with the opportunity to change their mind and access a 
different path toward empowerment.242 
Summary.  Marginalizing terrorist content and activity online should be a critical 
component of U.S. counterterrorism.  Not only would neutering terrorist groups’ online activity 
contain the dissemination of their propaganda, it would also make groups’ physical defeat more 
imminent.243  Without their preferred method of recruitment and incitement, terrorist groups will 
struggle to replenish their ranks and remain relevant.  Moreover, as the digital platforms and 
communication channels they rely on become less accessible, groups will find it harder to 
                                                      
240 Ross Frenett, Yasmin Green, and Richard Stengel, “Panel Discussion on Disrupting ISIS Recruitment Online,” 
moderated by William McCants, The Brookings Institution, filmed on September 7, 2016, YouTube video, 1:11:26, 
https://www.brookings.edu/events/disrupting-isis-recruitment-online/. 
241 Kent Walker, “Four Steps We’re Taking Today to Fight Terrorism Online,” Google in Europe, 
https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/four-steps-were-taking-today-fight-online-terror/. 
242 Braniff and Alexander, “Marginalizing Violent Extremism Online.” 
243 Cohen, “Digital Counterinsurgency.” 
 80 
coordinate their physical attacks, as well.244  However, perhaps the most significant benefit of 
immediately implementing a comprehensive strategy to defeat terrorist groups online is the 
valuable experience the counterterrorism community will gain.  As if today’s terrorist groups 
were not already difficult enough to defeat, lessons learned from constructing an effective online 
strategy will be beneficial for when the time comes to fight the next preeminent international 
terrorist organization, which will undoubtedly be more technologically advanced than al-Qaeda, 
the Islamic State, or any other group before it. 
 
Conclusion 
Eighteen years into the Global War on Terror, it is difficult to assess if the U.S. and its 
allies are winning.  Though the U.S.-led coalition has demonstrated tactical superiority on the 
battlefield, terrorist groups have demonstrated a proven ability to survive, despite their repeated 
losses.  It has become undoubtedly apparent that defeating these groups requires a dynamic 
approach.  While targeted military force can be an effective component of a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy, it should not be its centerpiece.  Empirically, law enforcement is far 
more effective than militaries in defeating terrorist groups.  It is better equipped to investigate 
and undermine the financial and logistical support structures that maintain terrorist operations 
despite high turnover rates in personnel.  Likewise, U.S. counterterrorism strategy would benefit 
from a fundamental reprioritization that moves away from fleeting battle victories and toward the 
larger ideological war.  Two decades of evidence suggests that capturing or killing every terrorist 
in the greater Middle East is not a realistic strategy.  Instead, decision-makers should place a 
concerted focus on understanding and addressing why individuals choose to become terrorists.245  
                                                      
244 Ibid. 
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Through the construction and communication of compelling counter-narratives, the 
counterterrorism community can begin to chart a path toward delegitimizing the ideology and 
organizations that comprise twenty-first-century terrorism.  Additionally, U.S. counterterrorism 
would benefit from implementing new initiatives designed to combat terrorists’ use of the 
internet.  By marginalizing the primary source of propaganda that enables radicalization and 
recruitment, policymakers and practitioners can depreciate the hold that terrorists have online 
and degrade a critical instrument for international terrorist operations.246 
Over the past two decades, the U.S. has become impressively adept at achieving military 
gains against terrorist groups, but it has repeatedly failed to translate tactical victories into 
strategic success.247  As a result, terrorist organizations have adapted to routine counterterrorism 
efforts and developed countermeasures of their own.  In order to initiate the decline of global 
terrorism, rather than continue to overlook its endurance, U.S. counterterrorism should prioritize 
combating the structures that allow terrorist groups to operate, such as illicit finance, online 
recruitment, and the perverse ideology that fuels their violent extremism.  If the U.S. and its 
allies can undermine the mechanisms that maintain terrorist groups, organizations will struggle 
to survive.  Though an effective, comprehensive counterterrorism strategy will require a whole-
of-government approach, enabling law enforcement, delegitimizing extremism, and 
marginalizing terrorists online will undoubtedly improve current U.S. strategy and create 
opportunities to deteriorate international networks, deter the formation of new groups, and 
distribute definitive defeats to terrorist organizations around the world. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Since 9/11, defensive counterterrorism tactics have prevented another large-scale, 
foreign-born terrorist attack on U.S. soil.  However, since 9/11, offensive counterterrorism 
tactics have been largely counterproductive, often creating more challenges than they solve.  
Today, there are nearly four times as many jihadist militants as there were on September 11, 
2001, signaling that the Global War on Terror has unintentionally produced more terrorists than 
it has removed.  Similarly, despite two decades of active combat, terrorist organizations have 
only continued to expand and grow, reaching record levels in both size and strength. 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and studying its history can prepare officials to 
combat its future.  For centuries, individuals and organizations have used violence to pursue 
political goals.  However, over the past 140 years, there have been four distinct waves of 
terrorism, the most recent of which has been comprised of religiously motivated terrorist groups 
such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.   Though each wave has eventually expired, the wave we 
face today has no end in sight; on pace to be the longest-lasting and having already produced 
unprecedented levels of violence.  By tracing empirical data, several conclusions can be made 
about the history, status, and future of terrorism.  Historically, terrorism has ebbed and flowed, 
occurred in hotspots, moved geographically, and been a global problem.  However, today’s 
terrorist activity is more frequent and lethal than ever before.  Terrorism has become highly 
concentrated in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, but is simultaneously growing in 
both global reach and intensity.  Moreover, the global trends and trajectories of terrorism 
demonstrate that in the 2020s, terrorist activity will continue to evolve, becoming increasingly 
dangerous, dynamic, and difficult to defeat. 
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Over the past eighteen years, the counterterrorism community has learned a number of 
lessons, but so too have terrorist groups.  They are now adapting to routine counterterrorism 
tactics and developing countermeasures of their own.  Today, terrorist organizations are 
transforming from condensed groupings to global networks as they build international alliances 
that enable their organizations to share resources and withstand counterterrorism pressure.  
Foreign fighters are dispersing across the globe and have the potential to form new terrorist 
groups, strengthen existing ones, or carry out lethal attacks of their own.  Terrorists around the 
world are also pursuing offensive cyber weapons capable of crippling critical infrastructure.  
Though there are a number of existing challenges that will continue to haunt counterterrorism 
officials in the next decade, including the longevity of lone-wolf terrorism and terrorist group’s 
pursuit of CBRN weapons, those identified in this project are emerging and immediate strategic 
challenges that lack an appropriate appreciation in current U.S. counterterrorism strategy. 
Furthermore, the Global War on Terror will soon enter its third decade, yet the 
international community is no closer to defeating twenty-first-century terrorist organizations.  
Despite tremendous financial and human resources, the U.S. and its allies’ military victories have 
been short-lived.  When one terrorist is captured or killed, another simply takes his or her place.  
This has largely been the product of misguided counterterrorism; strategy that fights today’s 
enemies while unintentionally creating tomorrow’s.  In the 2020s, this must absolutely change.  
U.S. counterterrorism would greatly benefit from refining the role of law enforcement, 
delegitimizing the ideology that fuels modern terrorism, and marginalizing terrorists online.  
Only by eroding the mechanisms that sustain terrorist operations, such as terrorist recruitment 
and finance, will terrorist groups become vulnerable to a definitive defeat. 
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As we enter a new decade, there will be a number of ways in which terrorist operations 
evolve.  However, the new decade also presents a timely opportunity for policymakers to refresh 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy and refocus it on eliminating terrorist groups’ abilities to 
regenerate and survive.  International terrorist networks will likely continue to grow and harden, 
foreign fighters will likely assemble to create the terrorist organizations of the future, and cyber-
terrorists will likely expand their arsenal of digital weaponry.  Though each of these challenges 
will be difficult to solve on their own, U.S. counterterrorism strategy must first focus on 
undermining the underlying mechanisms that allow terrorist groups to sustain their operations.  
Otherwise, counterterrorism efforts will continue to play catch-up, terrorist groups will continue 
to adapt and evolve, and by the time policymakers develop sensible strategies, terrorist groups 
will have discovered new ways to challenge international order.  To prevent perpetual 
participation in the everlasting Global War on Terror, policymakers should prioritize initiatives 
that erode the resilience of terrorist groups.  By doing so, the U.S. and its allies can begin to chart 
a new course in twenty-first-century counterterrorism, creating opportunities to moderate the 
global threat landscape and mitigate terrorism in the 2020s.  
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